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I. Introduction 
Ponder the plight of William and Patricia Eastman (The 
Eastmans)—homeowners who unfortunately suffered fire damage 
to their home on August 30, 2009.1 The Eastmans found a silver 
lining in this bleak happenstance and decided to build an addition 
and remodel their home.2 There was just one problem—their 
insurance provider, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), 
refused to comply with the homeowner’s fire insurance policy due 
to a disagreement over the damages calculation.3 The Eastmans 
subsequently filed suit on January 9, 2013, claiming breach of 
contract.4  
                                                                                                     
 1. Defendant Allstate’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of its Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Partial Summary 
Judgment at 6, Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14-cv-00703-WQH-WVG (S.D. 
Cal. Feb. 29, 2016), 2016 WL 1576165. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. (“[T]he Eastmans submitted a cost of repair estimate for 
$1,103,774.00. Allstate’s cost of repair estimate was $349,315.19. After 
considering the dueling estimates, the Neutral Contractor determined that the 
cost of repair was $718,613.25, a little less than the halfway point between the 
Eastmans’ estimate and Allstate’s estimate.”). 
 4. Defendant Allstate Insurance Co.’s Notice of Removal of Civil Action 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (Diversity Jurisdiction), Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 
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The Eastmans retained two experts to help with their 
insurance claim: Mario Zanelli, a contractor, to produce a 
construction estimate for repairs to their home, and Seb 
Ficcadenti, an engineer, to produce an engineering report.5 
Allstate issued subpoenas to both, seeking to depose them.6 
Initially, the depositions ran smoothly—Mr. Zanelli recorded six 
hours and forty minutes of testimony, and Mr. Ficcadenti recorded 
four hours and forty-five minutes of testimony.7 Struggles soon 
materialized, however.8 After the court granted a joint motion to 
extend the expert-discovery-cut-off period, Allstate issued two 
more subpoenas to depose Mr. Zanelli and Mr. Ficcadenti on 
December 23, 2015; this time, the Eastmans refused.9 A 
meet-and-confer failed to resolve the dispute, and the two parties 
filed joint motions for “Determination of a Discovery Dispute.”10  
In the Eastmans’ motion, they contended that Allstate should 
pay for the experts’ time at the deposition and time spent in 
preparing for those depositions,11 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(4)(E)(i).12 The district court concluded that, due to 
the ambiguity of the Rule’s language, fee-shifting for expert 
deposition preparation time is required only in extenuating 
circumstances.13 As a result, Allstate did not have to pay for Mr. 
Zanelli and Mr. Ficcadenti’s preparation time, putting that billable 
time on the Eastmans.14 
                                                                                                     
3:14CV00703 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016), 2014 WL 1373758. 
 5. Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.: 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 WL 
795881, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016). 
 6. Id. at *2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i) (“Unless manifest injustice would result, 
the court must require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a 
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or 
(D).”). 
 13. See Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.: 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 
WL 795881, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016) (saying that it is the “exception, not 
the rule”). 
 14. See id. (saying that there was “no evidence . . . as would justify an order” 
obligating Allstate to reimburse the Eastmans for their experts’ preparation 
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In an interesting turn of events, a generic breach of contract 
case morphed into an issue that federal district courts have been 
struggling to tackle for decades15—whether Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) 
obligates the party seeking discovery to compensate an expert for 
his deposition preparation time as “time spent in responding to 
discovery.”16 Though district courts have been cognizant of the split 
as far back as the 1990s,17 federal appellate courts have not fully 
addressed the issue.18 This has led to increased confusion and 
uncertainty in the Rule’s application, and many situations similar 
to the Eastman dispute. 
Historically, district courts across the United States have 
approached Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) four different ways. First, there is 
the approach that preparation time is a natural component of 
depositions, and that Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) intrinsically subsumes 
preparation time into its language.19 Second, some district courts 
have said that Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) wholly excludes preparation 
time.20 Third, a selection of courts argue that preparation time 
specifically excludes any time spent with the expert’s retaining 
party, or attorney; but includes the rest of the time as long as it is 
“reasonable.”21 Finally, a number of courts will shift expert 
deposition preparation time to the inquiring party only in 
extenuating circumstances.22 
                                                                                                     
times due to the lack of complexity and lapse in time). 
 15. See Hose v. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co., 154 F.R.D. 222, 227–28 (S.D. Iowa 
1994) (discussing other district courts’ interpretations of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)). 
 16. Id. at 224.  
 17. See Borel v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D. 275, 277 (E.D. La. 2010) 
(“Federal courts . . . are split on whether the rule allows parties to recoup fees 
from opposing parties for time spent in preparing for the opposition’s 
depositions.”).  
 18. See infra Part IV (describing the district courts approaches to Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i)). 
 19. See Collins v. Vill. of Woodridge, 197 F.R.D. 354, 357 (N.D. Ill. 1999) 
(“Time spent preparing for a deposition is, literally speaking, time spent in 
responding to discovery . . . .”). 
 20. See Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 
637 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“[I]t seems best to leave the retaining party free to have its 
expert prepare . . . at its own expense.”). 
 21. See Packer v. SN Servicing Corp., 243 F.R.D. 39, 42 (D. Conn. 2007) 
(avoiding reimbursement for time spent with retained attorney). 
 22. See Brew v. Ferraro, No. CIV.95–615–JD, 1998 WL 34058048, at *2 
(D.N.H. Sept. 1, 1998) (“While there may be an exception to the general rule for 
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To complicate matters even more, district courts are split not 
only across the circuits, but intra-district as well.23 As an example, 
consider two cases that came out of the Eastern District of 
Missouri in 2005.24 In May of that year, Judge E. Richard Webber 
declared that an expert’s “preparation time is beyond the purview” 
of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i), reflecting the second approach discussed 
above.25 Conversely, just two months later, Judge Stephen N. 
Limbaugh, Sr. declared—without reference to the previous case—
that Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) allows a judge to determine, ad hoc, 
whether preparation time is reasonable or not on a case-by-case 
basis.26  
Unfortunately, the difference in decisions and approaches 
recognized above are not uncommon, and this pattern has created 
a discernable fracture in the district courts’ application of Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i).27 Parties who find themselves entangled in this issue 
are often vulnerable to differing conclusions of law depending upon 
where the case is pending—be that in the same federal circuit, 
state, or district.28 
                                                                                                     
complex cases . . . the circumstances here do not warrant a shifting of the costs.”). 
 23. See United States v. Cap. Sand Co., No. 4:03CV6623NL, 2005 WL 
1668141, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2005) (discussing an admiralty case involving a 
collision of a boat and a dam); Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prods., Inc., No. 
4:04CV00485 ERW, 2005 WL 6749422, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 19, 2005) (discussing 
a damages expert and the plaintiff’s motion to depose him). 
 24. Cap. Sand Co., 2005 WL 1668141, at *1; Litecubes, LLC, 2005 WL 
6749422, at *1. 
 25. See Litecubes, LLC, 2005 WL 6749422, at *1 (saying that “it is unfair to 
place the financial burdens of preparing an expert for trial on the shoulders of the 
opposing party”). 
 26. See Cap. Sand Co., 2005 WL 1668141, at *9 (saying that “pursuant to 
[Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)]” an expert “is entitled to a reasonable fee” from the inquiring 
party for his deposition preparation time). 
 27. Compare Collins v. Vill. of Woodridge, 197 F.R.D. 354, 357 (N.D. Ill. 
1999) (“Time spent preparing for a deposition is, literally speaking, time spent in 
responding to discovery . . . .”), with M.T. McBrian, Inc. v. Liebert Corp., 173 
F.R.D. 491, 493 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“[A]s a general rule, [Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)] . . . does 
not require the party deposing an expert witness to bear the expense . . . unless 
it involves a complex case . . . .”). 
 28. Compare Lent v. Fashion Mall Partners, L.P., 223 F.R.D. 317, 318 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) “clearly contemplates 
remuneration for time spent responding to discovery requests, which would 
include reasonable preparation for a deposition”), with Magee v. Paul Revere Life 
Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 647 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that a reasonable fee will 
be included for time spent preparing for deposition by the expert, “but not for the 
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This Note provides a comprehensive discussion pertaining to 
Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)’s interpretation and application. Part II 
discusses the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), 
their promulgation and purpose, with emphasis on the history of 
Rule 26 and subdivision (b)(4).29 Part III discusses the lack of 
precedential value of legal decisions rendered by district courts, in 
contrast to federal appellate court opinions, and how that 
adversely affects parties in litigation.30 Part IV discusses the 
historical approaches federal courts have used in interpreting Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i).31 Finally, Part V argues that Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) 
should not be understood, or interpreted, to include deposition 
preparation time.32 The Rule’s language, its legislative history, and 
practical concerns warrant a narrow reading of the statute to 
include only time spent in depositions.33 
II. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
A. History and the Formal Rulemaking Process 
In 1934, Congress passed The Rules Enabling Act (Act),34 
which gives the Supreme Court the power to “prescribe general 
rules of practice and procedure.”35 When the Supreme Court does 
prescribe such rules, they must not “abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”36 The rules “set forth the procedures for the 
conduct of court proceedings and serve as a pattern for the 
procedural rules adopted by many state court systems.”37 As a 
                                                                                                     
time the expert spent preparing with the attorney who retained him”). 
 29. See infra Part II (showing how Rule 26(b)(4) came into existence). 
 30. See infra Part III (outlining the way district courts adhere to stare 
decisis). 
 31. See infra Part IV (providing the different approaches). 
 32. See infra Part V (highlighting that Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) was meant to 
include only depositions themselves). 
 33. See infra Parts V.A–C (discussing why Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) mandates only 
deposition time). 
 34. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2000)). 
 35. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012). 
 36. Id. § 2072(b). 
 37. Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, U.S. CTS., http://www. 
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limiting factor, Congress has final authority to either reject, 
modify, or accept proposed rules, and acceptance can be in the form 
of acquiescence.38 The Act is the lynchpin for all the rules of 
procedure existing today, with scholars noting that it impacts 
every litigant who passes through the federal litigation system.39  
Though the Supreme Court has the express power to propose 
rules, it invariably relies on advisory committees40 through the 
Judicial Conference,41 which is the “principal policy-making body 
of the U.S. Courts.”42 There are five advisory committees; most 
relevant to this Note, however, is the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee (Advisory Committee).43 The Judicial Conference 
appoints the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
commonly referred to as the Standing Committee, which reviews 
each recommendation by the Advisory Committee.44 
The formal rulemaking process proceeds as follows: (1) the 
Advisory Committee considers a proposed rule; (2) the Advisory 
Committee then issues the proposed rule publicly to garner public 
                                                                                                     
uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-
works/overview-bench-bar-and-public (last visited Nov. 26, 2017) [hereinafter 
Overview] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 38. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (emphasizing that Congress has seven months to 
make a decision).  
 39. See Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and 
the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 26, 26–27 (2008) (discussing history of the Act); see also A. 
Benjamin Spencer, “The Importance of Civil Procedure for Access to Justice,” with 
Professor A. Benjamin Spencer, YOUTUBE (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6RRIlGrk6s (highlighting the vital 
importance of the Federal Rules). 
 40. See Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1061 (1993) (describing 
the role of the judicial branch in the proposal of such rules). 
 41. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a) (2012) (providing the grant of power for the 
Judicial Conference to appoint such committees); see id. § 331 (prescribing the 
duties of the Judicial Conference). 
 42. How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-
rulemaking-process-works (last visited Nov. 26, 2017) [hereinafter Rulemaking 
Process] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 43. See id. (stating that there are committees for civil and bankruptcy 
matters, appellate procedure, evidence, and criminal proceedings). 
 44. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (“Such standing committee shall . . . recommend 
to the Judicial Conference . . . rules proposed . . . as may be necessary to maintain 
consistency and otherwise promote interests of justice.”). 
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comment45 and takes account of those comments; (3) the Advisory 
Committee then sends the proposed rule to the Standing 
Committee for review; (4) if the proposed rule is approved by the 
Standing Committee, the Standing Committee will send it to the 
Judicial Conference with a recommendation for approval; (5) if 
approved, the Judicial Conference will send the proposed rule to 
the Supreme Court, which promulgates the rule; (6) Congress then 
has seven months to review the rule and intervene at its discretion; 
and (7) if Congress does not act, the rule becomes effective.46 
1. The Creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
In 1935, following the enactment of the Act, the Supreme 
Court created the Advisory Committee and tasked it with 
formulating a set of uniform procedural rules.47 The Advisory 
Committee consisted of private attorneys, professors, and judges.48 
The Federal Rules it created were subsequently adopted in 1938.49 
The Federal Rules’ express purpose is “to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action.”50  
                                                                                                     
 45. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 
100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2006)) 
(requiring that proposed rules be issued for public comment); see also Nathan R. 
Sellers, Note, Defending the Formal Federal Civil Rulemaking Process: Why the 
Court Should Not Amend Procedural Rules Through Judicial Interpretation, 42 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 337–41 (2011) (discussing the reasoning behind why the law 
was created to inform the public of proposed rules). 
 46. See Overview, supra note 37 (noting that anyone can issue a proposed 
rule, or change, and suggest it to the Advisory Committee). 
 47. See Sellers, supra note 45, at 340 (discussing the intent of the drafters of 
the original Federal Rules). 
 48. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 
961–82 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, Historical Perspective] (providing background 
on the members of the original Advisory Committee); see also Judith Resnik, 
Failing Faith: Adjudication Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 499 n.24 
(1986) (stating that the Advisory Committee “was composed of leading lawyers 
(active in the bar and in politics)”). 
 49. See Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 REV. 
LITIG. 79, 80 (2006) (“The [Federal Rules] have attracted much general analysis 
and comment since their adoption in 1938.”). 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1938 amendment. The 
above quote is from the original language of Rule 1 from the 1938 version of the 
Federal Rules. Since then, Rule 1 has been amended frequently, with its latest 
WHAT DO I HAVE TO DO TO GET PAID 2239 
There is extensive scholarship within the legal community on 
the intent of the original Advisory Committee, with many scholars 
disclaiming what individual members wanted and what the group 
agreed upon.51 It is undisputed, however, that the “core tenets of 
the Federal Rules” were notice pleading, liberal amendments, and 
liberal discovery.52  
B. Discovery, Rule 26(b)(4), and Subdivision (E) and its 
Amendments 
1. The Fallacies Discovery Sought to Ameliorate 
Professor Edson Sunderland was the chief architect of the 
original discovery procedures in the Federal Rules.53 A strong 
proponent of liberal discovery, Professor Sunderland believed that, 
if you alleviate surprise at trial, there will be more efficiency 
within litigation.54 His view was that, the more information that 
                                                                                                     
revision occurring in 2015. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“They should be construed, 
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”). 
 51. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 274–77 (1989) (“[T]he Advisory Committee 
apparently had certain objectives . . . . The objectives are complex, subtle, and 
potentially inconsistent—and each procedural field and Rule had its own discrete 
history.”); see also Robert M. Covert, For James WM. Moore: Some Reflections on 
a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975) (calling the Federal Rules a 
“trans-substantive code of procedure”); Resnik, supra note 48, at 508–15 
(discussing that the drafters “held a series of assumptions about the kinds of cases 
litigated in federal court,” as well as what might have been the central goals for 
the Federal Rules); Subrin, Historical Perspective, supra note 48, at 922 (“The 
underlying philosophy of, and procedural choices embodied in, the Federal Rules 
were almost universally drawn from equity rather than common law.”). 
 52. Steven S. Gensler, Justness! Speed! Inexpense! An Introduction to the 
Revolution of 1938 Revisited: The Role and Future of the Federal Rules, 61 OKLA. 
L. REV. 257, 257 (2008). 
 53. See Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 58 MICH. L. REV. 6, 10 (1959) (“The reason we so much desired 
Sunderland’s help in this particular field was that it seemed an obvious place 
where a truly striking advance over existing procedures was indicated, and he by 
his writings and study had made himself the acknowledged master of this 
subject.”). Charles E. Clark was the Reporter for the original Advisory Committee 
and advocate of Professor Sunderland’s thinking on discovery. Id. 
 54. See Edson R. Sunderland, Improving the Administration of Civil Justice, 
167 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 60, 74 (1933) (“[A] trial which follows an 
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comes to light, the more “the true nature of the controversy [can] 
be satisfactorily ascertained”—especially to see where each party 
stands in relation to one another.55  
Professor Sunderland looked at the abundance of jurisdictions 
within the United States and noticed that there were 
“extraordinarily divergent” discovery procedures.56 There was the 
general, pervasive thought that “discovery [was] a dangerous 
practice which encourage[d] the production of framed-up cases and 
of fictitious evidence to meet the facts.”57 Additionally, some 
asserted that, if there were more lenient discovery, “fishing 
expeditions” would be a natural corollary—quite the opposite of the 
efficiency Professor Sunderland so strongly advocated.58 In 
drafting the original discovery rules, Professor Sunderland 
rejected that line of thinking.59 When the Advisory Committee 
finished fine-tuning the contours of its discovery rules, “virtually 
every known discovery method” was implemented: 
“interrogatories, oral depositions, written depositions, document 
requests, physical and mental examinations, inspection of 
property, and requests for admissions.”60  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court endorsed liberal discovery in 
the landmark case of Hickman v. Taylor.61 Justice Murphy, writing 
                                                                                                     
effective preliminary discovery gains much in efficiency.”). 
 55. Sunderland, supra note 54, at 74–75. 
 56. See id. at 75–76 (noting the different types of discovery practices). 
 57. Id. at 76. 
 58. Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND JR., DISCOVERY 
BEFORE TRIAL, at iii (Callaghan & Co. 1932) (“Hostility to ‘fishing expeditions’ 
before trial is a traditional and powerful taboo.”). 
 59. See Sunderland, supra note 54, at 74 (“Only by a preliminary proceeding 
in which each party may call upon the other to submit himself and his witnesses 
to interrogation under oath, can the true nature of the controversy be 
satisfactorily ascertained.”). 
 60. See Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 300 (2002) (drafting the discovery rules took place from 
1935–37). 
 61. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (stating that the 
discovery “rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment”). In Hickman, 
the Court considered whether the then relatively-new discovery rules permitted 
a party to access oral and written statements of witnesses taken by an adverse 
party in preparing for possible litigation. Id. at 497. On February 7, 1943, the 
tugboat “J.M. Taylor” sank while it helped tow a “car float” that belonged to the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad across the Delaware River of Philadelphia. Id. at 498. 
Unfortunately, five of the crew members drowned, and J.M. Taylor’s owners 
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for the majority, wrote that “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant 
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation”62—
a statement that was strikingly similar to what Professor 
Sunderland advocated.63 No longer would the defense of “fishing 
expeditions” be an impediment to discovery requests.64 As the 
Hickman case observed: “[Discovery] simply advances the stage at 
which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the 
period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise.”65 
2. The 1970 Amendments, Rule 26(b)(4)’s Promulgation, and 
Pre-Adoption Practices 
Despite the advances made in the initial creation of the 
Federal Rules, it was not until the 1970 Amendments that the 
Advisory Committee created Rule 26(b)(4).66 Prior to 1970, it was 
                                                                                                     
promptly hired attorneys to prepare to defend potential suits. Id. One of the 
attorneys, Fortenbaugh, interviewed the survivors and others about the accident 
“with an eye towards the anticipated litigation.” Id. Eventually, claims were made 
and thirty-nine interrogatories were filed. Id. One interrogatory asked to disclose 
statements taken from the remaining surviving crew members. Id. Fortenbaugh 
answered all interrogatories except that one, claiming privilege in preparation for 
litigation. Id. at 499. The Court reasoned that discovery is to be construed broadly, 
but it still has its limits, such as bad faith or mere annoyance. Id. at 508. The 
Court stated that it is essential for a lawyer to work with the expectation of 
privacy from intrusions by opposing parties. Id. at 510–11. Only where the 
lawyer’s files contain “relevant and non-privileged facts” that are hidden and are 
essential to the preparation of one’s case will discovery of their files be allowed. 
Id. at 511. In Hickman, there was not a strong enough reason for Fortenbaugh’s 
information to be disclosed—the interrogatory was “only a naked, general 
demand.” Id.  
 62. See id. at 508 (limiting the discovery to conduct not in bad faith “or in 
such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the 
inquiry”).  
 63. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text (noting the benefits of both 
parties having as much knowledge about the nature of the controversy as 
possible). 
 64. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507 (saying that there are, indeed, boundaries 
to such discovery, but still lenient nonetheless). 
 65. Id.; see also Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The 
Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 38 B.C. L. REV. 691, 
692 (1998) (discussing “why and how” the change in view of discovery occurred). 
 66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment 
(dealing with discovery of information from an expert retained by the adversarial 
party). There is a multitude of scholarship on Rule 26(b)(4) and its initial 
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common practice to deny discovery of the information provided by 
the adversarial party’s retained expert. Early cases submitted 
three reasons for the non-disclosure: (1) the work-product 
doctrine,67 (2) the attorney-client privilege,68 and (3) its overall 
inherent unfairness.69 The 1970 Advisory Committee repudiated 
the first two justifications and adopted the research of Professors 
Jack Friedenthal and Jeremiah Long.70  
                                                                                                     
promulgation. The 1970 Advisory Committee notes expressly reference Jack H. 
Friedenthal and Jeremiah M. Long as the main sources for their reasoning and 
decisions. See generally Jack H. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse 
Party’s Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455 (1962) (discussing jurisdictions’ 
reluctance to allow discovery of expert information); Jeremiah M. Long, Discovery 
and Experts, 38 F.R.D. 111 (1965/1966) (same). Throughout this section, points of 
reference can be made to Professors James Hayes and Paul Ryder, Jr. for their 
background work on Rule 26(b)(4) as well. See generally James L. Hayes & Paul 
T. Ryder, Jr., Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Discovery of 
Expert Information, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1101 (1988) (formulating a 
comprehensive tabulation of Rule 26(b)(4)).  
 67. See United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(discussing that the appraisal report prepared by the expert witness in 
anticipation of tax litigation constitutes work product); see also Carpenter-Trant 
Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257, 262 (D. Neb. 1959) 
(“[R]eports which an expert has submitted to counsel in preparation of the case 
for trial is a request for the attorney’s work product.”); Colden v. R.J. Schofield 
Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521, 522 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (using the precedent set out in 
Hickman to analyze whether the expert’s report should be discoverable).  
 68. See Am. Oil Co. v. Pa. Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 685–86 
(D.R.I. 1959) (stating that an expert’s conclusions are held under the 
attorney-client privilege); see also Schuyler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 
111, 113 (M.D. Pa. 1950) (denying a request for productions of documents 
prepared by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Cold Metal Process Co. 
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 684, 687 (D. Mass. 1947) (“To permit parties to 
examine the expert witnesses of the other party . . . where the evidence nearly all 
comes from expert witnesses, would cause confusion and probably would violate 
that provision of Rule 1 . . . .”). 
 69. See United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 597 (D. Md. 
1963) (“By the more modern and better-reasoned cases, discovery in this area, if 
denied, is denied on the ground of unfairness . . . .”); see also Lewis v. United Air 
Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940) (“To permit a party by 
deposition to examine an expert of the opposite party before trial, to whom the 
latter has obligated himself to pay a considerable sum of money, would be 
equivalent to taking another’s property without making any compensation 
therefor.”); Roberson v. Graham Corp., 14 F.R.D. 83, 84 (D. Mass. 1952) (seeking 
to interrogate an expert witness concerning his opinions is “impossible” in the 
absence of “special circumstances” because it would be “unfair” to the retaining 
party (citing Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593, 594 (D. Mass. 
1941))).  
 70. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment 
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Under the work-product doctrine71 and the attorney-client 
privilege,72 the early rationale was that disclosing expert 
information was akin to “making use of an adversary’s trial 
preparation.”73 The policy was that, “retaining, advising and 
conferring” with one’s expert makes them the agent of the 
attorney, “or in effect co-counsel to whom protection should 
extend.”74 Friedenthal and Long, however, argued that an expert’s 
opinions and conclusions were analogous to evidence, rather than 
communication.75 Thus, pre-trial discovery should not 
automatically bar experts from disclosure because parties have a 
legitimate need to conduct a thorough cross-examination of 
witnesses.76 The Advisory Committee notes added that expert 
cross-examination “requires advance preparation.”77 The idea that 
cross-examination preparation would occur for the first time 
during trial would “produce[] in acute form the very evils that 
discovery [was] created to prevent.”78  
From a perspective of fairness, courts were wary that parties 
would take advantage of the other party without having incurred 
                                                                                                     
(“For a full analysis of the problem and strong recommendations to the same 
effect, see Friedenthal, . . . Long . . . .”); Friedenthal, supra note 66, at 455 
(discussing expert restrictions in discovery); Long, supra note 66, at 112 (same).  
 71. First described in Hickman and codified in 1970, the work-product 
doctrine, Rule 26(b)(3), generally restricts discovery of documents or other 
tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) 
(granting discovery only if inquiring party substantially needs such information 
and has no other way, or will undergo undue hardship, to obtain the same or 
similar information). 
 72. The attorney-client privilege protects communication between an 
attorney and his client, if the communication was intended to be kept confidential 
and made to provide or receive legal advice. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 
403 (1976).  
 73. Long, supra note 66, at 117.  
 74. Id. at 140.  
 75. See Friedenthal, supra note 66, at 473 (“The conclusions of an expert are 
as much a part of the evidence as are his observations. Indeed his observations 
are controlled by his expertise which dictates the nature and direction of his 
inquiry.”); Long, supra note 66, at 141 (“Unlike an attorney’s, client’s or 
investigator’s recollection of potentional [sic] witnesses’ conversations or even the 
statements obtained from potential witnesses, expert information in the form of 
opinions and conclusions and the support therefor constitute evidence.”). 
 76. Friedenthal, supra note 66, at 465–66. 
 77. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.  
 78. Id. 
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the same expense.79 Friedenthal and Long argued that this was a 
legitimate reason to restrict discovery of expert information. They 
advanced two theories: (1) such information “constitute[d] 
property” of the expert and subsequently of the party who bought 
it,80 and (2) pre-trial disclosure would promote an atmosphere of 
laziness.81  
Pursuant to the property concept, courts went in two 
directions.82 The majority view was that a party could subpoena 
any expert to testify like ordinary witnesses concerning their 
general knowledge.83 The expert could not, however, be required to 
prepare himself beyond his current knowledge without just 
compensation.84 The minority view, on the other hand, declared 
that a party could not require an expert to testify, like any 
layperson, as to his expert opinions and conclusions unless he 
received payment.85 Professor Friedenthal analogized expert 
                                                                                                     
 79. See supra note 69 (providing case law with parentheticals briefly 
highlighting the unfairness rationale).  
 80. Friedenthal, supra note 66, at 479; accord Long, supra note 66, at 130–
31 (“Implicit in this view is the assumption that a property interest in favor of the 
party or the expert exists in the expert’s opinions.”). 
 81. See Friedenthal, supra note 66, at 480–81 (“[U]nlimited discovery would 
promote laziness and would permit parties to jockey for position by outwaiting 
each other before hiring experts.”); Long, supra note 66, at 123 (making use of 
opponent’s trial preparation). 
 82. See Friedenthal, supra note 66, at 479–81 (discussing the expert property 
concept); Long, supra note 66, at 130–39 (same). Professors Friedenthal and Long 
both discussed this extensively; case law will proceed with this discussion. 
 83. See San Francisco v. Superior Court of S.F., 37 Cal. 2d 227, 233–34 (1951) 
(saying that a doctor who tried to assert privilege personal to himself is denied 
because he is like any other witness); see also In re James’ Estate, 10 Ill. App. 2d 
232, 238 (1956) (discerning no difference between ordinary and expert witnesses). 
 84. See Early v. Shelter Ice Cream Co., 150 S.E. 539, 541–42 (W. Va. 1929) 
(discussing that a physician can demand extra compensation if the services are of 
the kind “not falling within the role . . . of an ordinary witness”); see also Gordon 
v. Conley, 78 A. 365, 366–67 (Me. 1910) (discussing whether an expert should 
receive additional compensation).  
 85. See Walsh v. Reynolds Metal Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378–79 (D.N.J. 1954) 
(saying that fairness dictates that the property interest in the expert’s knowledge 
can be dispensed only if the inquiring party pays for it); see also People v. 
Kraushaar Bros., 296 N.Y. 223, 225 (1947) (“We think the better rule is not to 
compel a witness to give his opinion as an expert against his will.”); Pa. Co. for 
Insurances on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Philadelphia, 105 A. 630, 630 (Pa. 
1918) (“The process of the courts may always be invoked to require witnesses to 
appear and testify to any facts within their knowledge; but no private litigant has 
a right to ask them to go beyond that.”). 
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knowledge as “like any other merchant’s stock in trade.”86 This 
minority viewpoint was grounded on three points. First, equating 
an expert to an ordinary witness can lead certain experts to be 
empaneled more often than less desirable experts.87 Second, as a 
practical matter, experts are more often than not forced to prepare 
to answer all the necessary questions.88 Third, though witnesses 
can be individuals who happen to be experts, Professor Friedenthal 
pointed out that, in certain circumstances, an expert’s “testimony 
as to the ‘facts’ in such cases often will indicate his expert opinions 
and conclusions”—leading to the inevitable homogenization of his 
expertise and mere factual experiences.89  
Under the laziness critique, Professors Friedenthal and Long 
saw that, if expert discovery was readily available, parties could 
take advantage of the adversarial party’s trial preparation.90 
Particularly less-active litigants could use that expert information 
to help receive favorable testimony at trial, promulgate trial 
strategies, and “lay the foundation for cross-examination in case 
the expert was called to testify.”91 The argument in favor of 
discovery was that the benefits of cross-examination outweighed 
any unfairness that would come about “in terms of time, effort, and 
money.”92 Professor Friedenthal noted that the natural 
consequence of cross-examination, however, is that it may lead to 
direct support of the inquiring party’s case.93 But, Friedenthal 
                                                                                                     
 86. Friedenthal, supra note 66, at 480. 
 87. See Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1, 13–14 (1877) (providing an argument 
that “physicians or surgeons” may be compelled to give their opinions in “any part 
of the State, at any and all times”).  
 88. See Kraushaar Bros., 296 N.Y. at 225 (putting emphasis on “callings 
where highly specialized knowledge is essential,” which require preparation so as 
to avoid the optics of ignorance). 
 89. Professor Friedenthal spoke of a “doctor” called to testify for treatment 
of a litigant for injuries. Friedenthal, supra note 66, at 481. Though the doctor is 
treated as an ordinary witness, certain observed facts can arise only because of 
his training and expertise. Id. In this scenario, the doctor’s testimony would run 
the risk of eliding ordinary facts and expert opinion.  
 90. Id. at 479; Long, supra note 66, at 123.  
 91. Friedenthal, supra note 66, at 483.  
 92. See id. at 487 (“The ultimate requirement that judicial decisions be based 
on the true facts overcomes any detriment which might be suffered by the 
adversary system.”). 
 93. See id. (“[T]he obvious objection to permitting unlimited discovery for 
cross-examination is that it is impossible to divorce information for purposes of 
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opined, a court can control only “the introduction of evidence at 
trial,” not its utilization.94 In the end, as Friedenthal explains, the 
benefits of cross-examination of expert witnesses cannot be 
downplayed: “The ultimate requirement that judicial decisions be 
based on the true facts overcomes any detriment which might be 
suffered by the adversary system.”95 
Using Friedenthal and Long’s research as a foundation, the 
1970 Advisory Committee modeled the initial version of 
subdivision 26(b)(4) on a procedure used by Chief Judge Thomsen 
in Knighton v. Villiam & Fassio.96 Judge Thomsen’s order reads as 
follows: 
A party, by means of interrogatories served under Rule 33, . . . a 
reasonable time prior to trial, may require any other party (i) to 
identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an 
expert witness at trial, and (ii) to state the subject matter on 
which the expert will testify. The party who served the 
interrogatories may proceed by any appropriate method to 
discover from the expert or the other party facts known or 
opinions held by the expert which are relevant to the stated 
subject matter and not privileged. It is so ordered in this case.97 
Additionally, the court mandated the inquiring party to pay the 
expert’s reasonable fees for “time spent in responding to 
                                                                                                     
impeachment from information to be used in direct support of the discoverer’s 
own case.”). 
 94. See id. (“A court . . . cannot prevent the use of information, ostensibly 
obtained for cross-examination only, to provide new approaches or to collect data 
which can be utilized by the discoverer’s experts but which information was 
obtained only after considerable calculation and expense to the adverse party.”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Knighton v. Villiam & Fassio, 39 F.R.D. 11, 13–14 (D. Md. 1965) 
(discussing the rule in the case). In Knighton, the court considered whether 
certain interrogatories asking about a defendant’s experts could go unanswered. 
Id. at 13. A longshoreman was struck by a “draft” while on the ship owner’s vessel. 
Id. at 12–13. The longshoreman brought suit claiming negligence and the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel. Id. at 13. The longshoreman submitted various 
interrogatories, with the ones in question pertaining to, inter alia, the defendants’ 
expert medical authority, whether or not said expert would testify, and the 
expert’s findings, opinions, and conclusions. Id. at 14. The court promulgated a 
new procedure to better handle expert discovery discrepancies. Id. at 13. The 
court then sustained the unanswered interrogatories using the new procedure. 
Id. at 14.  
 97. Knighton, 39 F.R.D. at 13. 
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discovery,”98 including depositions.99 The court made clear, 
however, that inquiring parties could not use the depositions to 
“conduct a preliminary cross-examination” to develop 
impeachment material or to obtain facts other than what the 
expert has been retained for.100 
The 1970 version of Rule 26(b)(4) had three components.101 
First, subdivision (b)(4)(A) gave a party the right to issue 
interrogatories to ascertain “each person whom the other party 
expect[ed] to call as an expert witness at trial.”102 Additional 
discovery requests concerning expert information needed court 
approval.103 Second, subdivision (b)(4)(B)—disclosure of facts and 
opinions of a non-testifying expert who is “retained or specially 
employed” in “anticipation of litigation, or preparation for trial”—
was held to a stricter standard.104 Only upon a showing of 
“exceptional circumstances,” or as provided in Rule 35(b), could the 
party seeking discovery get that expert information.105 Third, 
subdivision (b)(4)(C) obligated the court to require the inquiring 
party to pay the expert a reasonable fee for “time spent in 
                                                                                                     
 98. Id. at 14. 
 99. See id. at 13 n.2 (“Depositions upon Oral Examination . . . [and] 
Depositions of Witnesses upon Written Interrogatories . . . .”). 
 100. Id. at 13–14. There has been much discussion regarding the Knighton 
approach and the approaches suggested by Professors Friedenthal and Long; 
because the 1970 Advisory Committee notes acknowledge all three, for the 
purposes of this Note, it is not necessary to delve into the differences. See Michael 
H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Part One, an Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 907–08 
(discussing Knighton in relation to Professors Friedenthal and Long); see also 
Hayes & Ryder, Jr., supra note 66, at 1114–15 (same).  
 101. See Hayes & Ryder, Jr., supra note 66, at 1116 (providing the 1970 
version of Rule 26(b)(4)). 
 102. See id. (mandating that it must “state the subject matter on which the 
expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions 
to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each 
opinion”). 
 103. See id. (furthering discovery under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(i) was limited to 
the judge’s discretion “subject to such restrictions as to scope and such provisions, 
pursuant to” the fee-shift rule). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. (showing that exceptional circumstances required that the effort 
to be taken would be “impracticable for the party . . . to obtain facts or opinions 
on the same subject or by other means”). Rule 35(b) governs examiner’s reports 
and when they can be requested. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(b).  
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responding” to further discovery that was outside the scope of 
interrogatories.106 
The new provision embodied what Professors Friedenthal and 
Long suggested, and what the Knighton court ordered in 1965.107 
Subdivision (b)(4) was crafted to counteract the “fear that one side 
will benefit unduly from the other’s better preparation.”108 
Specifically, subdivision (b)(4)(C)109 was the first federally codified 
rule concerning fee-shifting for expert discovery in the Federal 
Rules. The 1970 Advisory Committee notes justified the 
fee-shifting provision by saying that it is “unfair to permit one side 
to obtain without the cost the benefit of an expert for which the 
other side has paid, often a substantial sum.”110  
3. The 1993 Amendments 
After the 1970 amendments, although expert information 
became somewhat easier to garner, access to expert information 
was still limited.111 The 1993 amendments substantially changed 
the discovery procedures for expert information.112 The 1993 
                                                                                                     
 106. See Hayes & Ryder, Jr., supra note 66, at 1116 (“[T]he court shall require 
that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee from spent in 
responding to discovery under subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this 
rule . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 107. See supra notes 66–95 and accompanying text (discussing 
pre-subdivision (b)(4) expert discovery procedures); Knighton v. Villiam & Fassio, 
39 F.R.D. 11, 13 (D. Md. 1965) (stating that the initial rule subdivision (b)(4) was 
eventually based on). 
 108. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment. 
 109. See infra Part II.B.5 (discussing the 2010 amendments and how 
subdivision (b)(4)(C) became the contemporary (b)(4)(E)).  
 110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(C) advisory committee’s note to 1970 
amendment (citing Lewis v. United Air Lines Trans. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. 
Pa. 1940); Walsh v. Reynolds Metal Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954)). 
 111. See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., SEPT. 7-8 MINUTES, at 15 (2006), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV09-2006-min.pdf 
[hereinafter COMMITTEE MINUTES] (discussing the rationale behind expanding 
expert discovery). 
 112. See Katherine A. Rocco, Note, Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: In the Interest of Full Disclosure?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2227, 2232 
(2008) (“While the 1970 amendments made the Rules more uniform, it was not 
until after 1993 that Rule 26 took on its current significance.”); see also Mathew 
Diller, The Impact of the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 134, 134 (1994) (“The revisions contain the 
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amendments acknowledged that interrogatories were “frequently 
so sketchy and vague that [they] rarely dispensed with the need to 
depose the expert.”113 The Advisory Committee was concerned that 
the expert information procedures put in place in 1970 were not 
achieving the level of efficiency and fairness for which they were 
created.114 Thus, the Advisory Committee added new provisions to 
Rule 26 and subdivision (b)(4).115 Two of the major changes, for the 
purposes of this Note, were the provisions for expert-written 
reports and the availability of depositions.116 
The first major change was Rule 26(a)(2)(B), requiring expert 
written reports.117 Prior to 1993, only interrogatories could be 
used, without court permission, to get the subject matter of the 
expert’s testimony under Rule 26(b)(4).118 After the 1993 
amendments, certain disclosures were to be made automatically in 
advance of trial; the disclosures concerned only those experts 
“retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony.”119 
The purpose of the report requirement was to provide a 
“reasonable opportunity to prepare for effective 
                                                                                                     
most seeping alterations of the discovery process since the initials promulgation 
of the rules in 1938.”); Sundeep Patel, The New Rule 26: Must Attorneys Disclose 
Opinion Work Product?, 3 BUS. L. BRIEF. (AM. U.) 53, 53 (2007) (addressing the 
changes in expert disclosure after and prior to the 1993 amendments). 
 113. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment 
(going so far as to say that the interrogatories did not help even the preparation 
for deposition). 
 114. See id. (noting that the “information explosion of recent decades” 
substantially increased the cost of discovery and could be used for “delay or 
oppression”). 
 115. See id. (discussing the new expert written report requirement, and the 
availability of depositions for subdivision (b)(4)). 
 116. See id. (stating the amendments were meant to “accelerate the exchange 
of basic information about the case and to eliminate the paper work involved in 
requesting such information”).  
 117. See id. (stating the reports were “intended to set forth the substance of 
the direct examination,” reflecting the potential testimony to be given). 
 118. See Hayes & Ryder, Jr., supra note 66, at 1116 (providing the 1970 
version of Rule 26(b)(4)); see also Patel, supra note 112, at 53 (“Before the 1993 
amendments, parties were limited to traditional discovery methods such as 
interrogatories in obtaining information from . . . testifying experts.”). 
 119. See Patel, supra note 112, at 54 (“The material that is provided by each 
expert is known as the expert’s report, and it must be disclosed without the need 
for any discovery requests.”). 
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cross[-]examination,”120 eliminate surprise to the opposing party, 
and conserve expenditures.121 The Advisory Committee hoped that 
the reports would “at least focus and expedite the deposition, and 
even avoid any need” for them in some cases.122   
The second major change was the newly revised Rule 26(b)(4) 
and its inclusion of a right to depose the adverse party’s testifying 
expert without the need for a court order.123 As a caveat, parties 
could not depose the expert until the expert provided the written 
report.124 The Advisory Committee noted that the change was 
because, in most courts, “depositions of experts [had] become 
standard.”125  
The Advisory Committee updated Rule 26(b)(4)(C),126 but kept 
the same language “to take account of the changes” of subdivision 
(b)(4)(A).127 The Advisory Committee tried to dispel any concerns 
about the right to depositions by stating that deposition costs 
“should be mitigated by the fact that the expert’s fees for the 
deposition will ordinarily be borne by the party taking the 
deposition.”128  
                                                                                                     
 120. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 121. See Reed v. Binder, 165 F.R.D. 424 (D.N.J. 1996) (“The test of a report is 
whether it was sufficiently complete, detailed and in compliance with the Rules 
so that surprise is eliminated, unnecessary depositions are avoided, and costs are 
reduced.”). 
 122. COMMITTEE MINUTES, supra note 111, at 15; accord Margaret A. Berger, 
Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1371 
(1994) (“The amendments to the Rules [were] designed to provide litigants with 
enough information through the reports so that a subsequent deposition can focus 
economically and efficiently on points that need elaboration.”). 
 123. See Patel, supra note 112, at 54 (“[A]llows a party to depose the 
opposition’s expert . . . .”). 
 124. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1993 
amendment (“[T]he deposition of an expert required by subdivision (a)(2)(B) to 
provide a written report may be taken only after the report has been served.”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See infra Part II.B.5 (discussing the 2010 amendments and subdivision 
(b)(4)(E)’s appearance). 
 127. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(C) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 128. Id. 
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4. The 2007 Amendments 
In 2007, the Federal Rules went through a “general 
restyling.”129 The restyling was an attempt by the Advisory 
Committee to make the Federal Rules easier to understand.130 
Rule 26 was not the only rule impacted; as a whole, the Federal 
Rules’ language changed in some shape or form, or were displaced 
altogether.131 No substantive changes or effects were “intended,” 
but merely meant as aesthetic adjustments.132  
Subdivision (b)(4)(C)’s structure was modified, and some of the 
language was changed. Thus, restructured subdivision (b)(4)(C) 
became: 
(C) Payment. Unless manifest injustice would result, the court 
must require that the party seeking discovery: 
(i) pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding 
to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (B); and 
(ii) for discovery under (B), also pay the other party a fair 
portion of the fees and expenses it reasonable incurred in 
obtaining the expert’s facts and opinions.133 
Besides subdivision (b)(4)(C)’s general restructuring, the changes 
from 1993 to 2007 do not stand out, but they do provide more 
clarity. One change, among others, was that the language was 
altered from “the court shall require” to “the court must require,” 
in regard to the inquiring party paying the expert a reasonable 
fee.134  
Perhaps the most substantial of the changes was when a party 
could act upon subdivision (b)(4)(C)’s fee-shift requirement. In 
1993, subdivision (b)(4)(C) stated that the expert would receive a 
reasonable fee for time spent responding to discovery “under this 
subdivision.”135 After the 2007 amendments, that phrase changed 
                                                                                                     
 129. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment. 
 130. See id. (“[T]o make them more easily understood and to make style and 
terminology consistent throughout the rules.”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. (“[S]tylistic only.”). 
 133. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(C) advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment. 
 134. Id. (emphasis added). 
 135. Hayes & Ryder, Jr., supra note 66, at 1116. 
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to “under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (B).”136 Even though the Advisory 
Committee did not intend substantive changes to the Federal 
Rules, a small number of recent court cases have said that this 
alteration narrows an expert’s reasonable fee to depositions only, 
rather than to other “compensable expert activities.”137 
5. The 2010 Amendments 
In the 2010 amendments, some additions were made to 
subdivision (b)(4).138 Subdivision (b)(4)(B), “Protection for Draft 
Reports or Disclosures,” provides work product protection for 
drafts of expert reports.139 Subdivision (b)(4)(C), “Preparation 
Protection for Communications Between a Party’s Attorney and 
Expert Witnesses,” protects as work-product communications 
between counsel and expert, save for three exceptions.140  
The Advisory Committee noted that, after the 1993 
amendments, “courts read the disclosure provision to authorize 
discovery of all communications between counsel and expert 
witnesses and all draft reports.”141 This led to a rise in costs and a 
“guarded attitude” by counsel toward their interactions with their 
experts, stymieing effective communication.142 
                                                                                                     
 136. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment. 
 137. See Young v. Liberty Mut. Grp., Inc., No. CV-12-02302-PHX-JAT, 2015 
WL 12669890, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 8, 2015) (“Rule 26(b)(4)[(C)] limits mandatory 
compensation of expert witnesses to the limit spent in relation to depositions.”); 
accord Nester v. Textron, Inc., 1:13–CV–920 RP, 2016 WL 6537991, at *2 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 3, 2016) (“Amendments . . . in 2007 narrowed the rule, changing it from 
requiring payment for any time a testifying expert spent responding to any 
discovery under Rule 26(b), to only requiring payment for time a testifying expert 
spent responding to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A), which covers depositions.”). 
 138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment 
(addressing concerns regarding excessive expert discovery of privileged 
information). 
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B). 
 140. The three exceptions are discussions (1) relating to “compensation for the 
expert’s study or testimony;” (2) identifying facts or data that the retaining 
attorney provided and the expert considered in formulating the opinions to be 
expressed; or (3) involving assumptions that the retaining attorney provided and 
that the expert considered in formulating the opinions to be expressed. Id. 
26(b)(4)(C). 
 141. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment. 
 142. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment 
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Subsequently, former subdivision (b)(4)(C) became (b)(4)(E).143 
The Advisory Committee said virtually nothing of substantive 
value pertaining to new subdivision (b)(4)(E)—only that a “slight 
revision has been made in (E) to take account of the renumbering 
of former (B),” which became (D).144 
III. District Courts and Their Own Precedent 
As briefly mentioned above, conflicting intra-district court 
decisions pertaining to deposition preparation time under Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i) are not uncommon.145 Parties can be vulnerable to 
differing conclusions of law that depend upon which district judge 
is presiding over their case in that particular district.146 In 
highlighting those discrepancies, this section will examine the 
doctrine of stare decisis and discuss the federal district courts’ 
attitude towards district court legal precedent.147  
A. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
The relationship between federal district courts, appellate 
courts, and the Supreme Court can be described as a system of 
vertical precedent—the rule that lower courts must abide by 
higher courts’ rulings.148 But, what happens when there are 
conflicting decisions within the same circuit court, or the same 
district court? What about differing interpretations of a statute 
                                                                                                     
(“[L]eading to undesirable effects.”). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text (discussing an Eastern 
District of Missouri intra-district split that was created over a two-month span).  
 146. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text (stating that Judge 
Webber had one interpretation, then two months later Judge Limbaugh had a 
differing interpretation, within the same district). 
 147. See infra Parts III.A–B (discussing federal courts and their obligations 
to precedent). 
 148. See Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Court of the United 
States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 790 (2012) (“[T]he practice of a lower court adhering to 
the decisions of courts with supervisory jurisdiction, or courts ‘with the power to 
reverse’ the judgment.” (quoting Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1143, 1179 (2006))).  
2254 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2231 (2017) 
between district court judges within the same district? How do 
disagreements among judges in a federal court affect the parties 
within those courts? The answer to these inquiries are governed by 
what is known as the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Stare decisis emerged from the development of English 
common law.149 Short for “stare decisis et non quieta movere”150—
stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm—stare 
decisis is ubiquitous throughout the U.S. federal judicial system.151 
The Supreme Court has said that stare decisis is “the means by 
which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, 
but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.”152 It can 
also be described as a “doctrine through which courts use opinions 
not merely to resolve cases, but also to make law in the form 
of . . . presumptively binding precedents.”153 To put it generally, 
stare decisis “refers simply to a court’s practice of following 
precedent, whether its own or that of a superior court.”154 There 
are two types of stare decisis: vertical and horizontal.155  
                                                                                                     
 149. See James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: 
Stare Decisis, The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 347 
(1986) (discussing the history of stare decisis and its creation through English 
common law). 
 150. Id. (emphasis added). 
 151. See Honorable Edward D. Re, Chief Judge, U.S. Customs Ct., Speech at 
a Seminar for Federal Appellate Judges (May 13–14, 1975) (discussing the 
function of stare decisis in attaining “two seemingly contradictory goals” of the 
judicial process: stability and change). 
 152. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986). 
 153. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 953, 956 (2005). There have been numerous ways in which stare decisis has 
been defined. See Mead, supra note 148, at 788 (“[W]here the decisions of the past 
control of the future.”); see also Or. Nat. Desert Assoc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 
F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2008) (being “bound by earlier published decisions of our 
court”); Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 411, 411 (2010) (stating that stare decisis is an “analytical system used to 
guide the rules of decision for resolving concrete disputes that come before the 
courts”). 
 154. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1011, 1016 (2003). 
 155. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic 
Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643, 649 
(2000) (discussing the difference between vertical and horizontal stare decisis and 
the Supreme Court’s use of horizontal stare decisis in the issuance of its own 
decisions).  
WHAT DO I HAVE TO DO TO GET PAID 2255 
Vertical stare decisis is the practice of lower courts adhering 
to the decisions of higher courts.156 Vertical stare decisis applies 
when the Supreme Court or appellate courts make decisions and 
mandates that lower courts follow such decisions.157 Circuit court 
decisions bind district courts within that circuit,158  and Supreme 
Court decisions bind all lower courts.159 
Horizontal stare decisis, on the other hand, is the action of a 
court following its own precedent, rather than a decision of a 
higher court.160 Horizontal stare decisis can be thought of in terms 
of policy.161 Federal appellate courts are technically not “inexorably 
command[ed]”162 by their prior decisions; however, they normally 
abide by horizontal stare decisis for policy and functional 
reasons.163 Some of the rationales include uniformity, stability and 
certainty in the law;164 historical and pragmatic considerations;165 
                                                                                                     
 156. See Barrett, supra note 154, at 1015 (following “the precedent of a 
superior court”).  
 157. See Thurston Motor Line, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 
(1983) (“[O]nly this Court may overrule one of its precedents.”). 
 158. See Mead, supra note 148, at 807 n.149 (“If there is a federal district 
court standard, it must come from the Court of Appeals . . . each of whom sits 
alone and renders decisions not binding on the others.” (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. 
for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430 n.10 (1996))); see also Charles A. Sullivan, 
On Vacation, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1143, 1179 (2006) (“[D]istrict courts in a given 
circuit are bound by the decision of the circuit in which they sit . . . .”). 
 159. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374–75 (1982) (“[T]he Court of Appeals 
could be viewed as having ignored, consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of 
the federal court system created by the Constitution and Congress.”). 
 160. See Mead, supra note 148, at 794 (“Most circuits have gone further than 
the Supreme Court and adopted very strong rules of intra-court stare decisis for 
panel decisions.” (emphasis added)). 
 161. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (“[P]olicy judgment that 
in ‘most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled 
than that it be settled right.’” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 
U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). 
 162. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932). 
 163. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 1361, 1361 (1988) (stating that judges will not overturn precedent “unless 
clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound”). 
 164. See id. (refusing to follow precedent “because of changed conditions and 
that more good than harm would come by departing from precedent”). 
 165. See William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of 
Constitutional Stare Decisis: Case, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic 
Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 57–81 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
considerations in binding itself to its prior decisions). 
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cost-saving functions;166 and the overall “presumption that [a 
court’s] prior judicial articulations of the law are correct.”167 
Though horizontal stare decisis is usually viewed in reference 
to the Supreme Court,168 federal appellate courts have developed a 
doctrine of horizontal stare decisis as well—called the “law of the 
circuit.”169 The law of the circuit declares that a decision by a 
three-judge panel is binding on subsequent panels of that court.170 
The only way to overrule a three-judge panel’s decision is to have 
the circuit court sit en banc, or have a contravening opinion by the 
Supreme Court.171  
                                                                                                     
 166. See Lee, supra note 155, at 648 (conserving “public and private litigation 
expenses” by preventing the “constant reconsideration of settled questions”). 
 167. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as 
Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 65 (1993). 
 168. See Consovoy, supra note 165, at 57 (discussing stare decisis in relation 
to the Supreme Court). 
 169. See Walter V. Schaefer, Reliance on the Law of the Circuit—A Requiem, 
1985 DUKE L.J. 690, 691 (1985) (discussing the law of the circuit and its 
consequences); see also Mead, supra note 148, at 789 (providing background on 
the “law of the circuit”). Circuit court horizontal stare decisis has also been termed 
“inter-panel accord.” See Sullivan, supra note 158, at 1180 (discussing its 
conceptual questions raised by the creation of horizontal stare decisis). It is also 
important to note the difference between horizontal stare decisis and comity. 
Comity is the relationship between courts of “equal jurisdiction,” where they give 
deference to a decision of one of its other sister circuits. See Mead, supra note 148, 
at 790 (providing more detail in the distinction between stare decisis and comity). 
 170. See Emery G. Lee III, Horizontal Stare Decisis on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 92 KY. L.J. 767, 771 (2003/2004) (discussing that 
the “norm of horizontal stare decisis is more strict” at the appellate level than the 
Supreme Court). 
 171. See Barrett, supra note 154, at 1018 (“A panel possesses the authority to 
overrule precedent only when there has been an intervening, contrary decision by 
the Supreme Court or by the relevant court of appeals sitting en banc.”). The Sixth 
Circuit, and others, have gone so far as to codify its horizontal stare decisis 
obligations. See 6th CIR. R. 206(c) (“Reported panel opinions are binding on 
subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a published opinion of a 
previous panel.”). Only published opinions get precedential effect, not 
unpublished opinions; although there has been vibrant discussion within the legal 
community as to whether that juxtaposition should even exist. See Bell v. 
Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 611 (6th Cir. 2002) (“It is well-established law in this 
circuit that unpublished cases are not binding precedent.”); see also Mead, supra 
note 148, at 798 n.84 (comparing both sides of the argument). The rule on 
published opinions also applies to district courts who are heeding its circuit 
court’s precedents and decisions. See id. at 799 (“As a result, lower district courts 
in the circuit need not follow unpublished decisions, but are fully bound by any 
published pronouncement.”). 
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Overall, horizontal stare decisis at the Supreme Court and 
appellate level, even though technically only policy, is accepted 
“without major objection.”172 In contrast, district courts, pursuant 
to their own legal precedents, act differently; precedent and 
uniformity are harder to come by.173 
B. Intra-District Judges’ Obligations to Each Other 
Congress has established a total of ninety-four federal district 
courts encompassing the United States, as well the territories of 
Puerto Rico, Guam, the Northern Marianna Islands, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands.174 Most states have only one district court, but, 
depending upon the size of the state, there can be more.175 Some 
districts are divided into divisions, but the divisions themselves 
“are of no real importance.”176 District courts are held to the 
authority of the regional circuit in which they preside,177 and 
within those districts sit district court judges.178 Currently, there 
                                                                                                     
 172. See Mead, supra note 148, at 799–800 (stating, however, that it was not 
always inevitable that the law of the circuit would be universally accepted). 
 173. See supra Part II.C (discussing district courts, their judges, and those 
judges’ duties to follow their fellow intra-district judges). 
 174. See 28 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2012) (stating that there will be a district court 
in each district); U.S. DIST. COURTS, ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS 5 (2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/districtauth_0.pdf [hereinafter 
DISTRICT COURT GRAPH] (providing a tabulation of the number of districts and 
where they are located in each state); see also Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 
Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters, 13 FED. PRAC. & PROC.  
JURISDICTION § 3505 (2016) (discussing district courts); JUDICIAL SERV.’S OFFICE, 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED 
STATES: AN INTRODUCTION FOR JUDGES AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN OTHER 
COUNTRIES 8–9 (4th ed. 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/federalcourtssystemintheus.pdf [hereinafter INTRODUCTION FOR JUDGES] 
(providing an overview of district courts). 
 175. See DISTRICT COURT GRAPH, supra note 174, at 1–6 (providing the number 
of districts in each state within each regional circuit). 
 176. See Wright et al., supra note 174, at § 3505 (“Since 1988 there has been 
no statutory requirement that an action be commenced in a particular division 
within a district.”). 
 177. See Colin E. Wrabley, Applying Federal Court of Appeals’ Precedent: 
Contrasting Approaches to Applying Court of Appeals’ Federal Law Holdings and 
Erie State Law Predictions, 3 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 1 (2006) (stating that it is 
the district courts within that federal circuit that must abide by the decisions of 
the circuit court). 
 178. See 28 U.S.C. § 132(b) (“Each district shall consist of the district judge or 
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are 667 permanent district judgeships in the United States,179 with 
Congress periodically increasing the number of district court 
judges.180 Although there used to be a plethora of districts with 
only one judge, Congress has seen to it that all but one district has 
at least two judges.181 Normally, only one judge will sit on a case 
pending in the district court; however, sometimes district courts 
hear certain matters en banc, via a three-judge panel, because they 
deem them highly important.182 
In contrast to the federal courts of appeals’ “law of the circuit” 
deference, there does not exist an equivalent “law of the district” 
at the federal trial level.183 Though sometimes expressly 
rejected,184 and other times dismissed without mention,185 “[i]t is 
[nonetheless] unclear whether district courts actually follow a rule 
of horizontal stare decisis” at all.186  
                                                                                                     
judges for the district in regular active service.”). 
 179. See id. § 133(a) (showing the number of district court judgeships in each 
state’s districts). 
 180. See DISTRICT COURT GRAPH, supra note 174, at 1–6 (showing that from 
1960 to 2016, there have been 426 additional district court judges appointed).   
 181. See id. at 6 (displaying that it is the Eastern District of Oklahoma that 
carries only one district court judge). 
 182. See Wright et al., supra note 174, at § 3505 (stating that statutes do not 
forbid en banc procedures); see also Ainsworth v. Vasquez, 759 F. Supp. 1467, 
1469 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (“Because this procedure will be at issue in many death 
penalty habeas corpus petitions pending in this court, the court has elected to 
determine the matter en banc.”). 
 183. See Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (rebuking the plaintiff’s assertion that “it was entitled to rely” on the 
previous district court’s ruling). Throughout this section points of reference can 
be made to Professor Joseph Mead’s Article on stare decisis’ presence in the lower 
federal court system. See Mead, supra note 148, at 790 (focusing on horizontal 
stare decisis). 
 184. See Threadgill, 928 F.2d at 1371 (“[T]here is no such thing as ‘the law of 
the district.’”); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates, 542 F. Supp. 807, 
816 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (“The doctrine of stare decisis does not compel one district 
court judge to follow the decision of another.”); Cactus Corner, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., 346 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1106 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (stating that there is no law 
of the district and providing other cases where those other courts expressly say 
the same). 
 185. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text (highlighting the district 
judge of the Eastern District of Missouri’s adoption of differing interpretations of 
Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i), pertaining to expert deposition preparation time, without 
reference to the earlier intra-district judge’s decision). 
 186. Erin O’Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game 
Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 736, 773 (1993). 
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As far back as the 19th century, district judges gave a great 
amount of deference to their intra-district judges’ decisions.187 It 
was rare for intra-district judges to contravene one another when 
drafting their opinions.188 Disagreements and departures from 
precedent were the exception, rather than the rule, for cases that 
concerned “unusual and exceptional circumstances.”189 Thus, 
intra-district court precedent had a strong presumption of validity. 
One court went so far as to say that in “the absence of palpable 
mistake of error,” prior district court rulings “should be respected 
as law.”190 
More contemporary cases, however, show a pattern that 
district judges no longer consistently adhere to the “exceptional 
circumstances” line of deference.191  District judges tend to “view 
the precedential effect of the other judges’ decisions as persuasive, 
but not binding authority.”192 The standard recital by a court is to 
                                                                                                     
 187. See Shreve v. Cheesman, 69 F. 785, 791 (8th Cir. 1895) (providing a 
multitude of cases where the court has respected the decision of a district court). 
 188. See Mead, supra note 148, at 800 (“Historically, district judges extended 
great deference to the prior decisions within their district.”); see also Daniel J. 
Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1095 (1994) (discussing district courts as courts of review in 
relation to bankruptcy court decisions and how their little expertise in the subject 
disincentivizes conflict). 
 189. See Mead, supra note 148, at 800–01 (discussing the early history of 
district courts’ adherence to their own precedent); accord Buna v. Pac. Far E. 
Line, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (“Judges of the same district 
court customarily follow a previous decision of a brother judge upon the same 
question except in unusual or exceptional circumstances.”); Rojas-Gutierrez v. 
Hoy, 161 F. Supp. 448, 450 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (“[V]arious judges who sit in the same 
court should not attempt to overrule the decisions of each other . . . except for the 
most cogent reasons.” (quoting Carnegie Nat’l Bank v. Wolf Point, 110 F.2d 569, 
573 (9th Cir. 1940))). 
 190. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stockwell, 143 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D. Minn. 1956). 
 191. See Mead, supra note 148, at 801–02 (providing case law showing the 
district courts’ pattern of behavior in putting less weight on intra-district 
precedent); see also O’Hara, supra note 186, at 773–74 (providing reasons as to 
why the shift in opinion has come about). Some circuit courts have even opined 
that district judges are not required to adhere to horizontal stare decisis. See 
Starbuck v. San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450, 457 n.13 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that a 
district court is not compelled “to follow the decision of another”). 
 192. Charles H. Nalls & Paul R. Bardos, Stare Decisis and the U.S. Court of 
International Trade: Two Case Studies of a Perennial Issue, 14 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 139, 146 (1990/1991); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates, 542 
F. Supp. 807, (N.D. Ga. 1982) (stating that there is no compelled decision to follow 
another district court judge, however, judges may still defer to prior decisions for 
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issue its own opinion and state that there is no “law of the district,” 
rather than first ponder whether precedent should be followed.193 
The rationale, suggested by some scholars, is that, due to the right 
to an appeal to a federal appellate court, the likelihood of a 
long-lasting conflict within that region is small.194  
Although there are occasional instances of district court judges 
extending deference to fellow judges in their district,195 such 
decisions do not erase the “considerable ambiguity regarding 
horizontal stare decisis in district courts.”196 While an argument 
could be made that horizontal stare decisis exists at the district 
court level—albeit not a strong argument—there is not enough 
case law to elucidate a clear district court doctrine. Therefore, 
horizontal stare decisis, if recognized at all, is merely persuasive 
authority that a district court judge can lean on for assistance—no 
different from an appellate court looking at its sister courts’ 
decisions.  
Not being bound by a prior district court decision enhances 
“great diversity in the approaches that district courts have taken, 
are taking, and could take in the future.”197 This is evident in the 
nation-wide district court fracture regarding the application of 
Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)’s regulation of expert deposition preparation 
time.198 
                                                                                                     
comity reasons). 
 193. See E.E.O.C. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 576 F. Supp. 1530, 1535 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“We concede at the outset of our discussion that the decision in 
Allstate is not binding precedent upon this Court. Indeed it would not be binding 
were its author appointed for this district.”). 
 194. See Nalls & Bardos, supra note 192, at 146–47 (“[M]akes it unlikely that 
conflicts of this nature will long survive.”). But see O’Hara, supra note 186, at 774 
(“Some litigants may forgo their right to appeal, notwithstanding conflicting 
precedents. Moreover, many appeals are disposed of summarily or with a 
nonprecedential memorandum opinion.”). 
 195. See Peterson v. BASF Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 964, 970 (D. Minn. 1998) 
(“We add that the doctrine of stare decisis, when applied to a prior ruling, on an 
identical question of law, by a coordinate Court in the same District, serves the 
considerable interests of consistency, and predictability of result.”). 
 196. Mead, supra note 148, at 801. 
 197. Id. at 800. 
 198. See infra Part IV (discussing the different district court approaches to 
Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)). 
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IV. Approaches to Interpreting Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) with Expert 
Deposition Preparation 
A nation-wide district court fracture regarding the 
interpretation of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) has been plaguing the courts 
as far back as the early 1990s.199 Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) states: “Unless 
manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the 
party seeking discovery . . . pay the expert a reasonable fee for 
time spent in responding to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or 
(D).”200 The crux of the disagreement focuses on the phrase “time 
spent in responding to discovery,” and whether that includes 
expert deposition preparation time.201 Historically, there have 
been four main approaches tackling this question. The first is that 
deposition preparation time is included in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) 
(reasonableness standard)—courts abide by the traditional rule of 
judges calculating a reasonable fee.202 The second approach is that 
preparation time is wholly excluded from Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).203 
Third, preparation time is reimbursable but not for time the 
experts spend with their retaining attorneys (retained-attorney 
time standard).204 Lastly, only in extenuating circumstances will 
expert deposition time be shifted to the inquiring party 
(extenuating circumstances standard).205 Though some federal 
                                                                                                     
 199. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 154 F.R.D. 212, 
213 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (“The court has found no published decisions . . . . [W]hether 
a party seeking to depose an expert witness must pay the deposition preparation 
time of that witness.”). 
 200. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i). 
 201. See Paz v. Our Lady of Lourdes Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 01–2693, 2009 
WL 1401696, at *2 (W.D. La. May 19, 2009) (“[F]ederal courts interpreting the 
rule are split on the issue . . . .”). 
 202. See Fleming v. United States, 205 F.R.D. 188, 190 (W.D. Va. 2000) 
(“[T]ime spent by an expert preparing for his or her deposition by opposing counsel 
is part of a reasonable fee under Rule [26(b)(4)(E)(i)].”). 
 203. See Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 
637 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“[I]t seems best to leave the retaining party free to have its 
expert prepare as thoroughly, and review his or her deposition transcript as 
meticulously, as it wish, albeit at its own expense.”). 
 204. See Mock v. Johnson, 218 F.R.D. 680, 683 (D. Haw. 2003) (stating that 
Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) encompasses preparation time, “but not for the time the expert 
spent preparing the attorney who retained him”).  
 205. See Brew v. Ferraro, No. CIV.95–615–JD, 1998 WL 34058048, at *2 
(D.N.H. Sept. 1, 1998) (“While there may be an exception to the general rule for 
complex cases . . . the circumstances here do not warrant a shifting of the costs.”). 
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circuits have had ample opportunity to clarify this issue,206 there 
has not been a thorough discussion of expert deposition 
preparation time other than at the district court level.  
A. The Reasonableness Standard 
In a typical scenario under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i), a reasonable fee 
is found through an analysis of a multitude of factors that help the 
district judge come to an equitable conclusion.207 Factors 
considered are: 
(1) The expert’s area of expertise; (2) the education and training 
that is required to provide the expert insight which is sought; 
(3) the prevailing rates of other comparably respected available 
experts; (4) the nature, quality and complexity of the discovery 
responses provided; (5) the cost of living in the particular 
geographic area; (6) the fee being charged to the retaining 
party; (7) fees traditionally charged by the expert on related 
matters; [and] (8) any other factor likely to be of assistance to 
the court in balancing the interests implicated by Rue 26.208 
These factors are used on a case-by-case basis, with each factor 
bearing different weight according to “the circumstances before the 
court.”209 The judge is to apply the facts to the judicially created 
rule and issue a determination using his discretion as to whether 
                                                                                                     
 206. See Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(saying that the district court’s changes in “limiting the billed preparation time 
of appellant’s two expert witnesses” were “reasonable deductions”); Halasa v. ITT 
Educ. Servs., Inc., 690 F.3d 844, 849 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The costs ITT would like to 
have reimbursed are for Lynch’s deposition preparation . . . .”). 
 207. See Goldwater v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 136 F.R.D. 337, 339 (D. Conn. 
1991) (“[T]here is very little authority as to what is meant by the term ‘a 
reasonable fee’ . . . .”). Goldwater was the first case to issue a set of factors to guide 
district judges in determining whether a fee request was reasonable. See id. at 
340 (listing the factors considered by the district court). 
 208. Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ., No. 07–3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 16, 2011) (citing Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 141 F.R.D. 493, 496 (S.D. 
Iowa 1992)). It should be noted that the court in Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 
141 F.R.D. 493 (S.D. Iowa 1992), disagreed with Goldwater’s inclusion of the cost 
of living in the geographical area factor; still, some district courts utilize it 
nonetheless. See id. at 496 (stating that the cost of living is “not directly relevant 
to a reasonable fee”). 
 209. Goldwater, 136 F.R.D. at 340. 
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the fee request is reasonable or not.210 The judge’s obligation is to 
find both that the fee or hourly rate is reasonable, and that the 
number of hours charged is reasonable.211 In the context of 
deposition preparation time, district courts that have adopted the 
reasonableness standard generally apply the factors discussed 
above.212  
The rationale given has been that “[t]ime spent preparing for 
a deposition is, literally speaking, time spent responding to 
discovery,”213 and thus Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) provides “explicit 
statutory authority.”214 Other courts have said that, because 
preparation “relates” to the deposition, it is therefore 
compensable.215 Interestingly, in the vast majority of cases, district 
courts do not even analyze whether deposition preparation time is 
included in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) at all.216 The general practice is to 
apply the reasonableness standard without providing a 
rationalization;217 equating preparation time to time spent in the 
deposition itself. 
                                                                                                     
 210. See Gray v. Dage, No. 2:10–cv–1928–TLN–EFB P, 2014 WL 5019666, at 
*1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014) (“Determining what constitutes a ‘reasonable fee’ for 
an expert witness at deposition is within the court’s discretion.”). 
 211. See Barnes v. District of Columbia, 272 F.R.D. 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(“Plaintiffs must . . . submit an invoice itemizing the charges for which they 
expect the District to pay. Once Dr. Kriegler has indicated in an invoice how many 
hours he spent on preparation for the deposition . . . then the Court can determine 
reasonableness.”). 
 212. See Borel v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D. 275, 278 (E.D. La. 2010) 
(discussing the factors set out above); see also Snook v. County of Maryland, No. 
07–14270, 2009 WL 928753, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2009) (same). 
 213. Collins v. Vill. of Woodridge, 197 F.R.D. 354, 357 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 214. Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, No. CIV. 01-3032-KES, 2006 WL 1788307, at *8 
(D.S.D. June 22, 2006). 
 215. Halasa v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:10–cv–437–WTL–MJD, 2012 WL 
639520, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2012). One court has stated that the preparation 
needs to relate to the deposition request, as a type of “but for” causation. El 
Camino Res., Ltd. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, No. 1:07–cv–598, 2012 WL 4794589, 
at *4 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2012). 
 216. See Granjas Aquanova S.A. de C.V. v. House Mfg. Co., No. 3:07–CV–
00168–BSM, 2010 WL 4809342, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 19, 2010) (“Aquanova 
requests reimbursement for the hourly fees charged by Lyman Scribner for 
preparing . . . the deposition . . . . [T]hese costs are reasonable and are hereby 
granted.”). 
 217. See Horizon Hobby, Inc. v. Ripmax Ltd., No. 07-CV-2133, 2009 WL 
3381163, at *8 (C.D. Ill Oct. 15, 2009) (saying that “$15,562.00 [was] an 
unreasonable amount to charge for deposition preparation”); see also El-Ad 
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B. Barring Fee-Shifting for Expert Deposition Preparation Time 
As the antithesis to the reasonableness standard, other 
district courts bar fee-shifting for expert deposition preparation 
time.218 With such a dearth of case law, there is little discussion of 
this approach. The two courts that have adopted this approach, 
however, have provided significant analysis as to why Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i) does not include expert deposition preparation time. 
The Eastern District of Missouri stated that fee-shifting for 
preparation time “goes beyond the purpose” of Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i).219 The court went on to explain that “each expert 
prepares for a deposition in a different way,” and that “the amount 
of time spent in preparing for a deposition . . . varies by expert.”220 
Additionally, experts “spend considerable time contemplating trial 
strategy as part of their preparation.”221 As a result, “it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the time spent in 
preparation for trial from the time spent preparing for a 
deposition.”222 
The Central District of California provided the same line of 
reasoning as the Eastern District of Missouri, and discussed other 
concerns as well.223 The court said that the “deposing party has no 
control over how much time an expert spends preparing for a 
deposition.”224 As a result, shifting expert compensation would, the 
court said, create a negative externality: the inquiring party would 
pay for the preparation time determined by the retaining party, 
                                                                                                     
Residences at Miramar Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. Mt. Hawly Ins. Co., Nos. 09–60723–
CIV, 09–60726–CIV, 2010 WL 4174711, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2010) (“Mr. 
LeBleu was therefore entitled to a reasonable hourly rate for the amount of time 
he spent preparing for and attending the deposition . . . .”). 
 218. See Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 
637 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (saying that it would be best to leave the retaining party to 
pay the expense); Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Prods., Inc., No. 4:04CV00485 
ERW, 2005 WL 6749422, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 19, 2005) (stating that deposition 
preparation time is beyond the purpose of the rule). 
 219. See Litecubes, LLC, 2005 WL 6749422, at *1. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See Rock River Commc’ns, 276 F.R.D. at 636 (explaining that, because 
depositions usually occur shortly before trial, “deposition preparation and trial 
preparation often inevitably overlap”). 
 224. Id. 
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which would result in substantial unfairness.225 Another concern 
the court noted was that preparation may also encompass 
irrelevant, unrelated matters that contribute nothing to the 
deposition; leaving inquiring parties to pay for inconsequential 
trivialities.226  
C. The Retained-Attorney Time Standard 
The retained-attorney time standard comes to the same 
conclusion as to the reasonableness standard: deposition 
preparation time is included in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).227 The only 
difference between the two is that the retained-attorney time 
standard prohibits any time spent “preparing” with the expert’s 
retained attorney.228 Courts fear that it is in fact a “dress 
rehearsal” for the expert’s eventual testimony at trial and not 
actual deposition preparation time.229 There inevitably is “great 
risk” in compensating such preparation, thus it is necessary to 
proceed with “caution.”230 Such caution is deemed warranted 
because it is inequitable for the inquiring party to pay for the 
expert’s time spent in helping the retaining party prepare for 
trial.231 In the end, the deposition would be a mere formality, with 
                                                                                                     
 225. Id. 
 226. See id. (stating that compensation would not enhance efficiency, and 
would be done for an “entirely partisan purpose”). 
 227. See Heiser v. Collorafi, Civ. No. 1:14-CV-464, 2016 WL 1559592, at *3 
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2016) (“Ordinarily, hours that an expert spends on preparation 
in connection with the expert’s deposition are compensable under Rule 
26(b)(4)(E).”). 
 228. See Mock v. Johnson, 218 F.R.D. 680, 683 (D. Haw. Nov. 10, 2013) (“Rule 
[26(b)(4)(E)] encompasses a reasonable fee for time spent by an expert preparing 
for deposition, but not for the time the expert spent preparing the attorney who 
retained him.” (quoting Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins., Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 647 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997))). 
 229. See Rhee v. Witco Chem. Corp., 126 F.R.D. 45, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“An 
expert’s deposition is in part a dress rehearsal for his testimony at trial . . . .”). 
 230. Am. Ref-Fuel Co. of Niagara, LP v. Caremeuse N.A., No. 02-CV-814C(F), 
2007 WL 2283768, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007) (citing Constellation Power 
Source, Inc. v. Select Energy, Inc., No. 3:04cv983 (MRK), 2007 WL 188135, at *8 
(D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2007)). 
 231. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. Of Teamsters, No. C 04-2767 JW 
(RS), 2008 WL 618897, at *2 (N.D. Ca. Mar. 3, 2008) (“Local 287 is not entitled to 
have Granite Rock pay for time Wollet spent in preparing to assist Local 287 at 
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the goal of the retaining party to protect its own interests as much 
as possible before trial232—hindering the deposition’s efficiency 
and ability to run smoothly.233 
In conjunction with using the factors from the reasonableness 
standard, courts adopting the retained-attorney time standard 
have additional factors they use.234 Courts look to the amount of 
time the experts claim, and the preparation times’ proximity to the 
deposition and the trial in order to determine whether the 
preparation by the expert was, in fact, trial preparation.235 
D. The Extenuating Circumstances Standard 
Courts adopting the extenuating circumstances standard 
disagree with the conclusion that the “plain language of [Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i)] mandates fee-shifting for time that experts spend in 
deposition preparation.”236 But, instead of disposing of the issue 
and agreeing with the minority of those courts which prohibit the 
fee-shift entirely, they instead have developed a carve-out for cases 
under specific conditions.237 Only in “extenuating circumstances” 
will fee-shifting for expert preparation time occur.238 Extenuating 
circumstances can appear in a variety of ways, and the standard 
                                                                                                     
trial.”). 
 232. See LK Nutrition v. Premier Research Labs, LP, 12 CV 7905, 2015 WL 
4466632, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2015) (calling depositions “strategy sessions”). 
 233. See Hose v. Chi. and N.W. Trans. Co., 154 F.R.D. 222, 228 (S.D. Iowa 
1994) (“[C]ompensating Dr. Golnick for his time spent reviewing Plaintiff’s 
medical records speeds the deposition process along, thereby saving on costs.”); 
see also Heiser v. Collorafi, Civ. No. 1:14-CV-464, 2016 WL 1559592, at *3 
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2016) (ensuring the fluidity of a deposition requires experts 
reasonably reviewing their work). 
 234. See Peterson v. Direct Coast to Coast, LLC, No. 3:14-cv-00284-MO, 2016 
WL 756562, at *4 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2016) (discussing additional factors used for the 
retained-attorney time standard). 
 235. Id.; see Heiser, 2016 WL 1559592, at *3 (looking at the deposition date in 
relation to the date the expert report was written). 
 236. Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.: 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 WL 
795881, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016). 
 237. See Brew v. Ferraro, No. CIV.95–615–JD, 1998 WL 34058048, at *2 
(D.N.H. Sept. 1, 1998) (describing the set of circumstances that need to occur for 
the fee-shift to be implemented for deposition preparation time). 
 238. See Eastman, 2016 WL 795881, at *6 (stating it is the “exception, not the 
rule”). 
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does not require a talismanic procedure as to what meets the 
standard and what does not.239 Historically, there have been two 
scenarios that have met the extenuating circumstances standard: 
complex cases,240 and cases involving significant lapses in time 
between the expert’s work and the deposition date.241  
The complex case exception applies when an expert has had to 
review a vast array of documents, seemingly complicated and 
dense in nature.242 Cases involving multiple experts have been 
found to be enough to be considered complex,243 in contrast to 
single defendant and plaintiff cases,244 and “simple contract 
case[s],”245 which have not been found to pass muster. 
Courts deciding cases involving considerable lapses in time 
from the expert’s work and the date of the deposition have also 
imposed fee-shifting.246 The rationale is that, because the 
deposition date was so far divorced from the time of the expert’s 
work, the expert “[could not] be expected to testify without 
[additional] preparation and review.”247 Further, repeated delays 
by the inquiring party can result in excessive preparation costs 
that the retaining party would be otherwise obligated to pay.248 
                                                                                                     
 239. See Rhee v. Witco Chem. Corp., 126 F.R.D. 45, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“There 
may be some cases where compensation of an expert for time spent preparing for 
a deposition is appropriate . . . .”). 
 240. See McClain v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., No. 89 C 6266, 1996 WL 
650524, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 1996) (“[I]n complex cases . . . compensation for 
deposition preparation is appropriate.”). 
 241. See M.T. McBrian, Inc. v. Liebert Corp., 173 F.R.D. 491, 493 (N.D. Ill. 
1997) (“[Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)] does not require the party deposing an expert witness 
to bear the expense of that expert’s deposition preparation time, unless . . . there 
has been considerable lapse of time between an expert’s work on the case and the 
date of his actual deposition.”). 
 242. See McClain, 1996 WL 650524, at *3 (stating that reviewing “voluminous 
documents” can require the fee-shift). 
 243. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 138 
F.R.D. 523, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (describing that Sears had to “retain many 
experts” in its litigation with the E.E.O.C.). 
 244. Rhee, 126 F.R.D. at 47.  
 245. M.T. McBrian, Inc., 173 F.R.D. at 493. 
 246. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 154 F.R.D. 212, 
214 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (requiring a fee shift for “considerable” lapses in time). 
 247. M.T. McBrian, Inc., 173 F.R.D. at 493. 
 248. See Rhee v. Witco Chem. Corp., 126 F.R.D. 45, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (saying 
that “the expert’s deposition [that] has been repeatedly postponed over long 
periods of time” by the inquiring party will warrant a fee-shift). 
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V. The Recommended Approach: Deposition Preparation Time 
Does Not Mandate a Fee-Shift 
This Note emphasizes the interpretation of the second of the 
four district court approaches: Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) never mandates 
the inclusion of expert deposition preparation time in a judge’s 
reasonable fee calculus.249 The purpose of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) is to 
prevent unfairness stemming from the inquiring party’s benefit at  
the expense of the retaining party’s diligence.250 The Advisory 
Committee’s broad canon, however, is reined in through Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i)’s limiting language and its amendment history. As 
such, there are three justifications that resolve this district court 
split. First, the term “discovery” shows that the Advisory 
Committee intended fee-shifting only during the course of the 
deposition; rather than during activities relating to the 
deposition.251 Second, the extenuating circumstances standard, in 
its attempt to focus on the purpose of the Rule, misconstrues the 
language of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) when it allows for a carve-out.252 
Third, it would nonetheless be infeasible, due to practical concerns, 
for Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to include deposition preparation time.253  
A. The Term “Discovery” Does Not Mean Matters Peripheral to the 
Deposition 
The phrase “time spent in responding to discovery”254 is 
ambiguous on its face. Viewed in isolation, it is not clear whether 
                                                                                                     
 249. See supra Part IV.B (discussing cases in which courts have opted not to 
shift fees to the inquiring party for deposition preparation time and the reasons 
why). 
 250. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment (“[I]t 
is unfair to permit one side to obtain without the cost the benefit of an expert for 
which the other side has paid, often a substantial sum.” (citing Lewis v. United 
Air Lines Trans. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940) and Walsh v. Reynolds 
Metal Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954))). 
 251. See infra Part V.A (explaining that the language and legislative history 
of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) do not include deposition preparation time). 
 252. See infra Part V.B (arguing that the extenuating circumstances standard 
misconstrues the language of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)’s fee-shift procedures). 
 253. See infra Part V.C (listing four practical concerns as to why Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i) should not include deposition preparation time). 
 254. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i). 
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it includes “time spent” only in the deposition when the expert 
“responds” to the inquiring party’s questions or if it includes 
actions relating to the deposition as well.255 Arguably, “time spent” 
by the expert travelling, preparing, or setting aside his work 
schedule pursuant to the deposition request also falls within Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i).256 Looking at the Rule’s language in reference to 
subdivision (b)(4) and its legislative history, however, shows that 
it is only during the deposition itself that expert fees can be 
transferred.257  
The term “discovery” within Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) refers to Rules 
26(b)(4)(A) and (D).258 Rule 26(b)(4)(A) allows a party the 
opportunity “to depose any person who has been identified as an 
expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.”259 Rule 
26(b)(4)(D) grants depositions of experts used only for trial 
preparation only in “exceptional circumstances.”260 As a result, the 
term “discovery” portrays the term “deposition” only as the 
deposition itself, rather than matters relating to it. There is no 
indication in the language of subdivision (b)(4) that fee-shifting for 
anything but depositions themselves is mandated.261 If the 
Advisory Committee wanted to include preparation time, the 
                                                                                                     
 255. Id.; see Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) 
(“We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning.”). 
 256. Travel time has been found to be included in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). See 
United States ex rel. Liotine v. CDW-Government, Inc., No. 3:05–cv–33–DRH–
DGW, 2012 WL 1252982, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2012) (“Generally, the time an 
expert spends traveling to a deposition by the opposing party is compensable.”). 
 257. See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1123 (2002) 
(highlighting the “importance of adhering to the text and Notes of a Rule” in the 
Federal Rules); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (Princeton University Press 1997) (“We look 
for . . . ‘objectified’ intent [from the legislature]—the intent that a reasonable 
person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of 
the [body of the law].”). 
 258. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i) (“[T]ime spent in responding to discovery 
under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (D) . . . .”). 
 259. Id. 26(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added). 
 260. See id. 26(b)(4)(D) (stating that a party cannot ordinarily “discover facts 
known or opinions held by an expert” unless by proving that it would be 
“impracticable” to try to obtain such facts or opinions). 
 261. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 
544 (1991) (discussing that the Court will not adopt a certain reading of a rule 
when there is “no indication that [it] is what the Advisory Committee intended”). 
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language of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) could have been: “time spent in 
responding to the discovery request,” or “time spent in responding 
to discovery, and matters relating to the discovery.”262 Those 
additions would allow efforts taken by the expert to include actions 
peripheral to the deposition. Without the word “request,” or the 
phrase “matters relating to the discovery,” actions attributable to 
“discovery” under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) encompass only time spent 
responding during the deposition.  
The interpretation of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) that fee-shifting is 
allowed only for time spent in the deposition is further bolstered 
through the Rule’s Advisory Committee notes.263 Though the 1970 
amendments did not expressly provide for depositions at the time, 
the Advisory Committee did explain the purpose of Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i): to put the onus on the benefitting party to pay for 
the expert’s time and expertise.264 Subsequently in 1993, the 
Advisory Committee provided more clarity as to its intent.265 After 
1970, the Advisory Committee noticed that interrogatories were 
not creating the efficiency it wanted through the Federal Rules.266 
It then suggested revisions granting the right to depose expert 
witnesses under Rule 26(b)(4)(A).267 Additionally, the 1993 
amendments included a requirement that experts provide written 
reports if they were retained to give expert testimony under Rule 
26(a)(2)(B).268 The report requirements were expected to alleviate 
                                                                                                     
 262.  The Supreme Court in Business Guides, Inc. fostered a similar 
counter-factual argument in the context of Rule 11. See id. at 545 (“Had the 
Advisory Committee intended to limit the application of the certification standard 
to parties proceeding pro se, it would surely have said so.”). 
 263. See supra Parts II.B.2–5 (discussing subdivision (b)(4)’s initial 
promulgation and Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)’s 1970, 1993, 2007, and 2010 amendments); 
see also Struve, supra note 257, at 1156 (“[T]he most logical evidence of such 
intent can be found in the Rule's text and Advisory Committee Notes.”). 
 264. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing subdivision (b)(4)(C)’s initial 
promulgation in 1970). 
 265. See supra Part II.B.3 (providing that the 1993 amendments mandated 
more disclosures and opportunities so as to reduce surprise at trial). 
 266. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment 
(saying that the interrogatories were “frequently so sketchy and vague that it 
rarely dispensed with the need to depose the expert”). 
 267. See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text (discussing subdivisions 
(b)(4)(A)’s purpose). 
 268. See Rocco, supra note 112, at 2236 (highlighting that the 1993 
amendments sought to “ensure ‘that opposing parties have a reasonable 
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the need for depositions altogether, or at the very least speed up 
depositions.269 The Advisory Committee hoped that, with the 
innovation of the report requirement, depositions would seldom be 
needed.  
Furthermore, the 1993 Advisory Committee stated: “[T]he 
expense . . . should be mitigated by the fact that the expert’s fees 
for the deposition will ordinarily be borne by the party taking the 
deposition.”270 The phrase “the deposition” signifies that Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i) is implicated only for the deposition itself.271 
Unfortunately, the Advisory Committee notes are devoid of any 
further explanation concerning the applicable scope of Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i). Analyzing the Rule, and subdivisions (b)(4)(A) and 
(a)(2)(B) together, however, one can glean that preparation time 
was not contemplated to be within the Rule. In fact, the expert 
written report is the preparation itself—not only for the purpose of 
increasing the efficiency of litigation, but depositions as well. 
Because the expert report requirement under subdivision (a)(2)(B) 
is silent on the matter of fee-shifts, it can reasonably be understood 
that deposition preparation time is not the inquiring party’s 
responsibility under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). 
B. The Extenuating Circumstances Standard Misconstrues Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i)’s Mandated Fee-Shift Requirement 
As discussed in Part IV.D, some courts permit fee-shifting for 
expert deposition preparation time only in extenuating 
circumstances.272 Courts that have adopted the extenuating 
                                                                                                     
opportunity to prepare for effective cross examination and perhaps arrange for 
expert testimony from other witnesses.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory 
committee’s note to 1993 amendment)).  
 269. See supra notes 117–122 and accompanying text (discussing that the 
expert written report mandates were enacted for pragmatic and fairness reasons); 
see also Patel, supra note 112, at 53 (enacting the 1993 amendments “to curb 
perceived abuses and delays in the civil justice system”). 
 270. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(C) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 271. See Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 
635 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“The Advisory Committee Note’s use of the phrase ‘for the 
deposition’ suggests that the shifting of expert fees is limited to the fees 
attributable to the deposition itself.”). 
 272. See supra notes 236–248 and accompanying text (providing that 
extenuating circumstances have historically involved complex cases or large 
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circumstances standard have two different interpretations of Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i). The majority view is that the Rule does not include 
deposition preparation time, but in instances of unfairness the 
fee-shift can occur.273 On the other side, other courts have said 
that, although the plain language of the Rule does not include 
preparation time, the Rule’s vague language allows the courts 
leverage to determine scenarios when “fee-shifting is justified.”274 
The majority view effectively goes beyond Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)’s 
enumerated powers given to the court. Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) says that 
a “court must” require the inquiring party to compensate an 
expert’s “time spent in responding to discovery.”275 The courts that 
have adopted this interpretation implicitly concede that time spent 
preparing for the deposition does not fall within Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i).276 With that concession, a court no longer has the 
power to issue the fee-shifting mandate for preparation time under 
any circumstance because the Rule disallows such a result.277 Only 
                                                                                                     
lapses in time between the expert’s work and the deposition date).  
 273. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 154 F.R.D. 212, 
214 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (“[A]s a general rule, [Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)] . . . does not require 
the party deposing an expert witness to bear the expense of that expert’s 
deposition preparation time.”). 
 274. Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.: 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 WL 
795881, at *6 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016). 
 275. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i) (emphasis added). 
 276. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 138 
F.R.D. 523, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (stating that the Rule “does not permit recovery 
for time spent ‘preparing’ for a deposition”). 
 277. Parties who feel that fee-shifting is needed can always try and motion to 
the court for a protective order under Rule 26(c)(1). Rule (c)(1) states that a party 
can “move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending—or as 
an alternative on matters relating to a deposition, in the court for the district 
where the deposition will be taken.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). If good cause can be 
shown, a court can issue the order “to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or under burden or expense.” Id. Pertinent to this 
Note is subdivision (B). Subdivision (B) allows a court to issue a protective order 
for “the allocation of expenses.” Id. 26(c)(1)(B). The Advisory Committee, however, 
has spoken on subdivision (B) and has warned that the express “authority does 
not imply that cost-shifting should become a common practice. Courts and parties 
should continue to assume that a responding party ordinarily bears the costs of 
responding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2015 
amendment (emphasis added). Courts have heeded the Advisory Committee’s 
warning and have usually issued such orders only “under limited circumstances.” 
United States ex rel. Bibby v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., NO. 1:06-CV-0547-AT, 
2016 WL 7365195, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 2016); accord Oxbow Carbon & 
Minerals LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 11–cv–1049 (PLF/GMH), 2017 WL 
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in times of potential “manifest injustice” to the party seeking 
discovery can a court refuse to issue the fee-shift.278 A court cannot 
take the inverse of that and grant a fee-shift in certain 
circumstances if a court declares from the outset that deposition 
preparation time does not fall within the purview of Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i).  
The minority view sees the vagueness of the language of the 
Rule as a gateway in order to determine whether “fee-shifting is 
justified” on a case-by-case basis.279 That interpretation is a 
misconstruction of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). Again, fee-shifting is always 
justified when an expert’s actions fall within the Rule “[u]nless 
manifest injustice would result.”280 The courts adopting this 
carve-out provision effectively change the Rule’s procedural 
language. Thus, according to the extenuating circumstances 
standard, the inquiring party is not mandated to pay an expert for 
deposition preparation time, unless the “time spent in responding” 
occurs within certain circumstances.281 This construction of Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i) lacks a sufficient foundation from the Rule’s express 
language and the Advisory Committee.282 The Rule requires only 
an action that is in response to “discovery,” not a determination of 
the circumstances surrounding the response to “discovery.” The 
extenuating circumstances standard puts policy above the 
                                                                                                     
4011136, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2017) (discussing that Rule 26(c)(1)(B) should 
only be invoked sparingly); McClurg v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., No. 4:12-CV-00361-
AGF, 2016 WL 7178745, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2016) (same). 
 278. See United States v. Twin Falls, 806 F.2d 862, 879 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The 
language of the rule is mandatory . . . . [But] the court may decline to award 
expenses if it finds that manifest injustice would result.”). 
 279. Eastman, 2016 WL 795881, at *6 n.2. 
 280. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i) (“[T]he court must require . . . .”).  
 281. See Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.: 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 
WL 795881, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016) (saying that it is the “exception, not 
the rule,” and that it must decide “whether such circumstances [were] present” in 
the case); see also Stevens v. CoreLogic, Inc., No.: 14-cv-1158 BAS (JLB), 2016 WL 
8729928, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 2016) (“This Court is in agreement with those 
that hold that reasonable expert deposition preparation fees are compensable 
only in complex cases or in extenuating circumstances.”). 
 282. See Eastman, 2016 WL 795881, at *6 n.2 (declaring that the vague 
language of the rule indicates to the court the “drafters’ intent”). This would seem 
to contradict what the Eastman court said in its previous note when it stated that 
the Advisory Committee notes “provide only the most limited guidance.” Id. at *5 
n.1.  
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language of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) and the Advisory Committee’s 
legislative discourse.283 
C. Practical Concerns for Not Including Deposition 
Preparation Time  
Ironically, the district court approaches, besides the 
reasonableness standard, highlight the same or similar 
justifications in reaching their different conclusions.284 The 
Advisory Committee promulgated subdivision (b)(4) for the 
purpose of speeding up the litigation process, and reducing 
surprise at trial.285 Most district courts have expressed caution 
about rewarding expert deposition preparation time when taking 
into account the Advisory Committee’s goals;286 they have 
expressed three main concerns that should be addressed. 
Additionally, as discussed above, the absence of strong horizontal 
stare decisis at the district court level further warrants a narrow 
reading of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).287  
First, deposition time reimbursement runs the risk that an 
expert and the retaining party will develop trial strategy at the 
expense of the inquiring party.288 As a result, the deposition itself 
                                                                                                     
 283. See Struve, supra note 257, at 1110 (“[S]ome lower courts have similarly 
felt free to strain the Rules’ text, and ignore relevant Notes, in order to implement 
their own views of desirable policy. . . . [S]uch an approach enlarges the powers of 
the courts beyond their proper boundaries.”). 
 284. Compare Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, No. C 04-2767 
JW (RS), 2008 WL 618897, at *2 (N.D. Ca. Mar. 3, 2008) (“Local 287 is not entitled 
to have Granite Rock pay for time Wollet spent in preparing to assist Local 287 
at trial.”), with Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Prods., Inc., No. 4:04CV00485 
ERW, 2005 WL 6749422, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 19, 2005) (“[E]xperts spen[d] 
considerable time contemplating trial strategy as part of their preparation for a 
deposition.”). 
 285. See supra Parts II.B.2–3 (highlighting subdivision (b)(4)’s initial 
promulgation and subsequent amendments in order to show that its evolution 
was designed to assuage unfairness and abuse in a federal civil trial). 
 286. See supra Parts II.B–D (discussing a multitude of district courts that 
have adopted constraining standards attributable to Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) and the 
goals it was promulgated to achieve). 
 287.  See Struve, supra note 257, at 1120 (stating that there is a trend that, 
for the sake of subjective policy, lower federal court judges tend expand the 
Federal Rules’ text). 
 288. See Peterson v. Direct Coast to Coast, LLC, No. 3:14-cv-00284-MO, 2016 
WL 756562, at *4 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2016) (avoiding the risk of rewarding “time 
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would be an all-expenses-paid “dress rehearsal” for the retaining 
party for the eventual trial.289 This is not to say, however, that a 
party cannot use the deposition as a way to practice for trial.290 In 
other words, the practical concern is that, if the inquiring party 
finances such trial preparation, then there is little benefit the 
inquiring party is receiving; the retaining party would actually be 
the benefactor. Such an outcome is contrary to the underlying 
rationale of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).291  
Second, it has been held that, because no two cases are ever 
the same, each expert is thus going to prepare differently and 
spend different amounts of time preparing for the deposition.292 
Therefore, judges are ill-equipped to determine a reasonable fee 
under the circumstances in each case for preparation time.293 
Courts have acknowledged that it is difficult to quantifiably reduce 
an expert’s philosophy on preparation to a reasonable number 
according to the circumstances.294 Though various courts have 
implemented ratio standards295—i.e., for every x amount of time in 
                                                                                                     
spent in trial preparation” by looking at the expert’s claim of time spent preparing 
in relation to the deposition date). 
 289. See Rhee v. Witco Chem. Corp., 126 F.R.D. 45, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“An 
expert’s deposition is in part a dress rehearsal for his testimony at trial . . . .”). 
 290. See HENRY L. HECHT, EFFECTIVE DEPOSITIONS 460 (2d ed. 2010) (allowing 
a party to depose an expert gives that party the chance to “see[] the expert’s ‘dress 
rehearsal’ . . . and will [thus] have ammunition for cross-examination” later at 
trial). 
 291. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment 
(saying that it is “unfair” for the inquiring party to benefit at the retaining party’s 
expense). 
 292. See Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Prods., Inc., No. 4:04CV00485 
ERW, 2005 WL 6749422, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 19, 2005) (stating that preparation 
for depositions varies by expert). 
 293. See Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.: 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 
WL 795881, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016) (“[J]udges are in an extremely poor 
position to determine whether a particular amount of preparation time is 
reasonable in any particular case.”). 
 294. See Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 
636 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (emphasizing no control over how much time an expert 
spends preparing). 
 295. See Collins v. Vill. of Woodridge, 197 F.R.D. 354, 358 (N.D. Ill. 1999) 
(adopting a “ratio of one and one-half the length of the deposition”); see also 
Nordock Inc. v. Sys. Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 577, 583 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (approving a 
“3:1 ratio for preparation time”); Constellation Power Source, Inc. v. Select 
Energy, Inc., No. 3:04cv983 (MRK), 2007 WL 188135, at *8 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 
2007) (limiting preparation time reimbursement to the amount of hours in the 
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a deposition, the expert may claim y amount of preparation time—
this actually has the potential for experts to over-prepare, and 
force the inquiring party to pay more in situations when it 
otherwise would not be necessary to do so.296 Scrutinizing each 
party’s “respective levels of preparation of their experts” would 
force a court to “second-guess” counsel’s own choice in determining 
what, and how much, preparation is appropriate.297 
Third, preparation time reimbursement incentivizes experts 
and parties to charge fees for time that is irrelevant to the 
deposition.298 The concern is that the retaining attorney will use 
the reimbursement opportunity to spend time with the expert for 
activities unrelated to the efficiency of the deposition.299 For 
instance, parties using preparation time as a tool to transfer 
payment for time otherwise billable to the retaining party.  
Finally, the lack of horizontal stare decisis at the district court 
level warrants a narrow interpretation of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). Some 
have said that horizontal stare decisis is not strong in the federal 
trial level because, among other reasons, it handles a multitude of 
tasks—such as analyzing both the law and the facts—while 
appellate courts mostly handle narrow legal issues.300 As discussed 
in Part III.B, district courts will not likely accumulate an 
equivalent “law of the circuit.”301 This conclusion only buttresses 
the exigency for a consistent application of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). 
Unlike normal federal circuit splits that arise frequently, district 
                                                                                                     
deposition).  
 296. See Eastman, 2016 WL 795881, at *5 (increasing overall costs from the 
implementation of ratio standards). 
 297. Rock River Commc’ns, 276 F.R.D. at 636–37. 
 298. See Heiser v. Collorafi, Civ. No. 1:14-CV-464, 2016 WL 1559592, at *3 
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2016) (reviewing the amount of time an expert spent changing 
his testimony in review of his report). 
 299. See Am. Ref-Fuel Co. of Niagara, LP v. Caremeuse N.A., No. 02-CV-
814C(F), 2007 WL 2283768, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007) (suggesting that the 
possibility of trial preparation can lead to charging the opponent for unwarranted 
fees); see also Rock River Commc’ns, 276 F.R.D. at 636 (“[T]asks that contribute 
little or nothing to the efficiency of the deposition . . . .”). 
 300. See Mead, supra note 148, at 822 (stating that there are “structural 
reasons why consistency should only exist at higher levels of judicial review,” 
including the “scope and timing of discovery,” and making “factual findings that 
depend on highly individualistic assessments of facts”). 
 301. See supra Part III.B (discussing district courts and their lack of 
horizontal stare decisis). 
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court splits put parties in a special category of vulnerability 
because of a lack of an application of legal precedent.302 This is 
because, at the appellate level, litigants are at least on notice 
regarding the application of a law—whether they think it wrong or 
correct.303 An inter- and intra-district court split, on the other 
hand, leaves a law’s application to the discretion of an individual 
judge, not the law of the court.304 Unfortunately, Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) 
is placed in that unique latter category of court splits.305 Because 
the Rule lacks discussion at the federal appellate level, it cannot 
be applied consistently in a region, let alone across the United 
States.306 Thus, it is best to apply Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) down to its 
simplest form. It would give parties sufficient notice as to the 
Rule’s application without wondering how it might be applied until 
                                                                                                     
 302. See supra notes 191–198 and accompanying text (highlighting that 
district court judges apply what they think the law says in lieu of any other 
intra-district decisions concerning the same law). 
 303. See Mead, supra note 148, at 793 (“Concern for predictability reflects the 
recognition that change in the law disturbs the foundation for countless human 
interactions.”). 
 304. As Alexander Hamilton poignantly stated in Federalist 78: “To avoid an 
arbitrary discretion in the courts . . . it is indispensable that they should be bound 
by . . . precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every 
particular case that comes before them . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 455 
(Alexander Hamilton) (ABA ed., 2009); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE 
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (Legal Legends ed., 2010) (“‘If a case was 
decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same 
judgment today if I am a plaintiff’ . . . . Adherence to precedent must then be the 
rule [not] the exception if litigants are to have faith in the . . . courts.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 305. See Irreparable Injury in Constitutional Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 255, 264 
(1936) (“[T]o the extent that the trial court’s discretion is controlling, the principle 
of stare decisis has little effect.” (emphasis omitted)). To make matters worse, the 
Supreme Court has historically emphasized that rules of procedure cases should 
be given far less stare decisis effect than other cases. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in 
cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are 
involved, . . . the opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving 
procedural and evidentiary rules.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Mead, supra note 
148, at 793 (“Procedural rulings (another area where variation is most tolerated) 
usually do not implicate reliance interests, making stare decisis considerations 
less important.”). 
 306. See supra notes 156–172 and accompanying text (discussing the 
difference between vertical and horizontal stare decisis, and that, in lieu of a 
higher court ruling, the lower court is not bound by any precedent).  
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they know who their judge will be.307 Furthermore, a repeated 
application may signify to the Advisory Committee that the Rule 
should be adjusted if it feels that the Rule is not being applied 
properly.308  
VI. Conclusion 
For over twenty years, district judges have differed in their 
application of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) in relation to expert deposition 
preparation time. This is due, in part, to district judges having 
near unilateral deference given to them by their fellow judges 
through a substantial lack of horizontal stare decisis. In contrast 
to the federal circuit courts of appeals, a district judge is not 
obligated to follow his intra-district judge’s decisions because there 
is no equivalent “law of the district.” This lack of constraint, in 
conjunction with Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)’s relative obscurity, continues 
to place litigants in vulnerable positions depending upon the 
region in which their case is pending.  
There have been four interpretational approaches to Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i). First, expert deposition preparation time is 
naturally included into the language of the Rule. Second, Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i) wholly excludes deposition preparation time. Third, 
only time spent by the expert with his retained attorney is 
excluded from Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)’s fee-shift mandate. Finally, 
                                                                                                     
 307. See Barrett, supra note 154, at 1031 (“Stare decisis is regarded as a 
doctrine of judicial restraint.” (citing Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and 
Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (saying that stare 
decisis “restrain[s] the discretion that legal indeterminacy would otherwise give 
judges”))). Such an application of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) would also be consistent with 
past Supreme Court rulings that the Federal Rules be given “their plain 
meaning.” Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989).  
 308. See Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. 
REV. 1165, 1171 (2016) (“When a court makes a decision contrary to the intent of 
the legislature or contrary to values the legislature now cherishes, regardless of 
the intent of an earlier, enacting legislature, the legislature can override the 
court’s decision and regain control of the statute’s application.”). Additionally, the 
Advisory Committee has a history of amending the Federal Rules in light of 
disliked federal court practices that contradicted the Federal Rules’ purpose. See 
supra notes 138–142 and accompanying text (stating that the Advisory 
Committee added Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) in 2010 to account for courts 
consistently granting discovery of all communication between an expert and his 
retaining attorney). 
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although deposition preparation time is not generally included in 
Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)’s language, the fee-shift can be initiated when 
extenuating circumstances are present. This Note proposes that 
the only feasible interpretation of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) is to bar 
fee-shifting for expert deposition preparation time. For reasons 
such as the Rule’s limiting language, its concurrent Advisory 
Committee notes, and practical concerns, Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) 
should be construed narrowly to allow fee-shifting for only 
depositions themselves. Any change in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) should 
go through “the process specified in the Enabling Act, rather than 
tak[e] effect through judicial fiat in the course of litigation.”309 
                                                                                                     
 309. Struve, supra note 257, at 1102; accord ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
But though I have no quarrel with the common law and its process, I 
do question whether the attitude of the common-law process judge—
the mind-set that asks, “What is the most desirable resolution of this 
case, and how can any impediments to the achievement of that result 
be evaded?”—is appropriate for most of the work that I do, and much 
of the work that state judges do. We live in an age of legislation, and 
most new law is statutory law. 
